43
October 1988

SOVIET WEEKLY
WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

Looking for a new model of socialism in Hungary

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

HOW TO MAKE MONEY IN THE SERVICE SPHERE –

tips from a Finnish businessman

Drawing by Leonid Tishkov

NEW TIMES

No. 43, October 1988

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Was psychiatry used to suppress dissidence in the U.S.S.R.? Has everything been done to guarantee patients' rights? The chief psychiatrist at the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health answers our questions.

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Cover by Victor Brel

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Sieghard Bussenius
Reinbek, F.R.G.

■ I was riveted by the Zholkver–Isakov "An Echo of the War" in issue No. 13 for this year. It seems to me, therefore, that the attitude in your country to POWs and internees is beginning to change. I myself saw that the Soviet citizens whom the nazis transported to Germany were, but for a few exceptions, neither cowards nor traitors.

In 1942-45 there was a POW concentration camp near where I lived. Some 2,700 men, women and children, of whom some 30 per cent were Russians and Ukrainians, were held there. It is said that at this camp, known as Wiesenfeld Glinde, the worst conditions both inside and at work (the prisoners were employed at a Krupp enterprise manufacturing aircraft engine parts) were for the Russians.

Thirteen people from the Soviet Union are buried at the Klosterbergen Cemetery in Reinbek. Last year we held a service for them to honour the memory of the victims of the nazi dominion in our country. The public repercussions were so wide that we decided to set up a worker association to research the Wiesenfeld camp and study its history. We are currently contacting countries whose nationals were imprisoned here in 1942-45 and hope that the appropriate organizations in your country will respond to our proposal.

I am also sending you data concerning several Soviet soldiers buried in the neighbouring cemetery. They are Andrei Kraptilo, born October 15, 1906, died April 18, 1945, Afanasy Sokolenko, born May 1, 1900, died April 27, 1945, and Vladimir Mirinov, born July 21, 1922, died June 24, 1945.

I regret to say that I know nothing more about them. We of the Reinbek Peace Initiative, who wish to preserve the memory of these people in the F.R.G., would like to know whether there are any papers of recollections about them today in the Soviet Union, and whether their relatives are alive.

My address is: Sandweg 37, D-2057, Reinbek, F.R.G.

OPINIONS

Natalya Aleksandrova,
student
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

■ In August this year Josef Brodsky, the Nobel laureate in literature, was reading his poetry at one of the concerts of the Scandinavian Book Fair held in Göteborg, Sweden.

Several minutes before the concert still without a ticket, I stood by the Fair's press centre watching people queue up at the entrance, many of them brought along books by Brodsky which were sold right at the exhibition stands.

Josef Brodsky appeared on stage. The applause died down and the master of ceremonies, speaking English so that everybody could understand, said a few words about the poet's life ("I took leave of my country /Where I was born and bred/ There are cities of those who forgot me"), about his idea of artistic hierarchy, his political views. Then, accompanied by the intoning Swedish translation, a weary-looking man read his famous verses, oblivious of the audience and its reaction. In the interval we came up to him and he was not surprised to see Russians here. He was polite and attentive, he told us he hoped to see his poetry published back home. "How was my reading tonight?" asked he, turning his head at the same instance from enthusiastic praise: he had long renounced fame and public opinion.

A few days later Brodsky returned to New York, I was back in Moscow camping on the doorstep of different offices, pleading to xerox the book of Brodsky's poetry I'd bought in Sweden. Wherever I went all I got was a careful explanation why xeroxing was not a wise thing to do (copyright considerations were not mentioned). All right, there is nothing for me but to sadly behold Brodsky's autograph on the title page of his book.

A MATTER AT ISSUE

Valery Protasov
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

■ Thumbling through some Western magazines recently, I came across an interesting article which suggested that if the Soviet Union were to cut back on its armed forces stationed in the socialist countries, this might facilitate talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. Why not have this point discussed in your columns?

Renben Barr,
San Francisco, U.S.A.

■ In the issue No. 29 July 1988, I read with interest an article titled "Teacher-pupil cooperation" by Simon Soloveichik. I'm surprised that no mention is made in it of parents participation in school activities.

In the U.S. parent participation is encouraged and welcomed. Regular meetings are scheduled between teachers and parents. Parties and entertainment are also arranged. The pupils are brought in to be an important element in school affairs.

Of course counselling, even instruction of some parents is necessary. Learning and teaching should continue in the homes as well as the schools. Teaching will become easier and more productive when it is integrated on all levels, both students and parents doing teaching easier.

The schools can become centres of cultural, social, and festive programmes.

Most likely my suggestions are now in place in the Soviet Union, as well as progressive improvements far beyond my suggestions.

In the U.S. parents teaching never ends, classes function for adults, night schools. How about the Soviet Union?

Alexander Sukhomlin,
Kherson, U.S.S.R.

■ Sean O'Kelly's letter in No. 35 for this year deals with a very delicate issue. True enough, the death sentence is an extreme penalty. In fact, it is unhuman, as it robs the human being of his greatest asset. One can say that the death sentence is a "weak point" in a society which, for a number of reasons, is unable to restrain certain individuals from crime. When compelled to use this extreme penalty, society acknowledges as it were its own imperfections, and the ineffective nature of the various reformative, moral and other factors that should have restrained the criminal, but failed to do so. However, allow me to ask whether there is any society in the world that from time to time does not acknowledge its weakness. I fear there isn't.

GLASNOST

In many countries the death penalty has been replaced by life imprisonment. Interested in what life is like in those countries – I mean France and Italy – I have concluded that this humanitarian gesture by the state has by no means led to greater humanitarianism in society as such. We are shocked and indignant at the terrorism of the "red brigades" and the neo-fascists, by the murderous activities of mafia hitmen, by lone killer, maniacs and the like. Is that not why France is currently discussing the possibility of reintroducing the death penalty?

It seems to me that our society has not yet attained a level of respect for the individual that allows us to abolish the death penalty. I think that all attempts to assure us that this can and must be done are so much empty talk. Humanism cannot be abstract. Indeed, Shakespeare once said that one must be cruel to be kind.

V. Kuznetsov
Schoolteacher,
Candidate of Educational Sciences
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

■ Your contributors Ksenia Myalo and Simon Soloveichik remind me how, quite recently, at a research institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, I heard a doctoral thesis presented flashily entitled "The Extracurricular Labour Education of Schoolchildren."

The aspirant doctor read off a list of three names of his official opponents, also holding doctor's degrees, who had praised the aspirant doctor to the skies. They cheerfully enunciated their conclusions that "labour education is the transformation of what has been learned into the personal qualities of the individual, when knowledge is transmuted into conviction... and skills are perfected... The combination of instruction and productive labour in the effort to achieve the objectives of labour education ensures the all-round development of personality in schoolchildren. The school, along with its educational and instructional processes, primarily exerts a societal pedagogical impact... via persuasion, explanation and stimulation to work."

How fine it would be, I thought, if the teacher could, indeed, by means of persuasion, punishment and explanation, transmute his own desires into the personality qualities of the said pupil ... or if, by combining instruction with productive labour, the schoolteacher could rapidly acquire a rounded free, and developed personality. In short, can miracles be achieved by pedagogical influence? Have not these miracles led to brutality in youths and girls, and produced the Kazan and other phenomena? And have not these blunt authoritarian pedagogics alienated pupils from school teachers and morality?

In one contribution Simon Soloveichik proposed sending a team to Kazan so that the theorists V. Korotov and B. Likhachev could demonstrate their pedagogic professionalism and expertise in practice. I propose that the team be augmented to include the professional pedagogues from the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences.

Tommy Cartier
Scaer, France

■ Since 1960 I have been corresponding with a citizen of Gorky. By his birthday I usually send him a small present. This year it was a pair of miniature quartz watches. But in his reply my friend apologized for refusing to accept the present because he was asked to pay 40 rubles as customs (according to my estimates, the two watches cost half this sum). With a pension of 98 rubles, he could not afford such a sum. The parcel returned with seals of the Soviet customs office. But having opened the parcel I found only one watch in it. There was no explanation for the loss.

Being a long-time subscriber to your magazine, I immediately recalled a letter from Sergei Sokolov, your reader in Tula (issue 31/88), who wrote that his pension of 97 rubles was not enough for him. I thought that the minimum pension of Soviet people is higher. As for the Soviet customs service, it should improve its work.

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

GLASNOST

CARRYING ON THE DISCUSSION

Vladimir Reprintsev
Kiev, U.S.S.R.

■ Please accept my congratulations on V. Ganyushkin's "We must go all out!" in your issue No. 36 for this year. It is daring, challenging, and excellently written, and shows genuine pain for our common cause. I think the progress of perestroika needs critical and unbiassed analysis. It expresses anxiety at our failure to get out of the rut of the so-called stagnation period. Much that is being done today reveals something half-hearted about the venture. We either don't know how to bring things to a conclusion, or don't want to. I would like to see more in the way of Ganyushkin's "view," as then perhaps change will be hastened.

HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK

PRIVATE OPINION

FRANZ VRANITZKY, Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria

I believe that my talks with Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov in Moscow have further increased mutual understanding in Austro-Soviet relations. I would like to thank the Soviet Premier for his ability to create a favourable atmosphere at the talks. It is important now that businessmen from the two countries should also establish personal contacts and have confidence in each other.

Austria welcomes the Soviet programme of reforms, linking it with hopes for an early conclusion to the exchange of views at the Vienna follow-up meeting to the Helsinki conference. Talks between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals are expected to open soon in the Austrian capital. Compensating for nuclear disarmament by increasing the sophistication of conventional armaments must be prevented. We should not be lulled into complacency, or harbour illusions that these weapons are harmless.

I see multi-ethnic Europe with its variety of national cultures as a continent free of military and political blocs, and I am glad that this concept is shared by the Soviet leadership.

VLADIMIR KRUPIN, writer

The first Soviet-West German meeting on environment protection recently took place in Moscow. It was sponsored by the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the Soviet Writers' Union, the Rhein-Westphalia Foreign Society and the Robin Wood Society of Non-Violent Action for Nature and Environment. Before the meeting the German guests visited Chernobyl, Leningrad and Irkutsk.

In our country, foreigners are usually taken round the Golden Ring, which links a number of historical cities of Russia. But these cities are mostly window-dressing. Today foreigners should also be taken to Cherepovets and the Kola Peninsula, the Kuznetsk coal basin and Sverdlovsk and indeed to the Urals in general. They should be told that disease and infantile mortality in the Soviet Union are primarily a consequence of man tampering with nature.

We glorified the taming of nature and did not wait for bounty from it, forgetting that we are an integral part of it and, as it has turned out, not the best part. If the whole is damaged, its constituent parts are automatically damaged as well.

A narrow departmental approach is doing considerable harm to our country. Minimata disease in Japan was caused by the dumping of chemical waste in coastal waters. In this connection the Soviet media bitterly criticized the capitalist system, which cripples people for the sake of profit. But what about us? What are we aiming at?

We called for the establishment of a State Committee for the Protection of Nature, and it has been set up. But does the committee know that there are plans to build an atomic power plant in Kirovo-Chepetsk, which is already facing ecological problems. And what about the Crimea or Archangel? If the committee even knows about such plans, it is utterly helpless to defeat them, as well as hundreds of others of the same kind. Moreover, nobody is going to consult it before undertaking similar projects.

We are pinning our hopes on the public and on reciprocal international control, perhaps indeed only on such control. We must act quickly, because the inroads into nature are outstripping our efforts to protect it. Evil is more active than good. We are constantly on the defence, that is, we are constantly suffering defeats.

There is one other important thing – human relationships. The protection of nature is essential because disregard of the commandment to "love thy neighbour" has dangerously affected not only relations between people but also their attitude to nature. Thus, nature conservation depends on the normalization of social life. Smoking and hard drinking are a consequence, not a cause. The cure for them lies not in disciplinary measures but in man's confidence in the morrow.

The Roman Empire perished because of the lust for luxury. Aren't we witnessing the same thing today? Hunting after luxuries, creature comforts and amusements can be likened to the arms race. The less man possesses, the less he is possessed.

The concepts of civilization and progress have been confused. Is a nation to be regarded as great only because it produces bombs and missiles? Is a breakthrough into space a victory of mind over matter? No, it is merely the desire for supremacy, a cold calculation. An imperfect man is unable to devise a perfect machine. Scientists and engineers have grown conceited, thinking they can do everything. The call to lead a simpler life would be beneficial to nature.

Ostpolitik in the era of dialogue

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl on his forthcoming visit to Moscow. A talk with Hans-Dietrich Genscher. A breakfast given by Defence Minister Rupert Scholz.

Our special correspondents report from Bonn:

Even political old hands in Bonn don't seem to remember such interest by the press and the public in a foreign tour by a West German leader. The topic was in the headlines long before the actual date of the visit. Nearly every political action or speech by the Chancellor over the last six months was guided by his forthcoming meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. For this there are several important reasons.

Russia in vogue

The Bundesbürger has substantially changed his attitude to the Soviet Union, largely because of Moscow's new policies at home and abroad. In fact, the Federal Republic is just beginning to discover its Eastern neighbour; old stereotypes are collapsing and, as Lev Kopelev, a Russian writer living in West Germany, has noted, new bridges are starting to span the abyss of mutual ignorance.

The popularity of the Soviet leader in West Germany has been very high. Mikhail Gorbachev leads the list of the most popular politicians, both West German and foreign, and his book on perestroika remains a bestseller.

Official Bonn cannot of course overlook this and is trying its best, not without success, to live up to the wave of sympathy for the U.S.S.R. No doubt, at the bottom of their hearts some West German politicians cannot share these feelings. But in any case, this wave is beneficial to the peoples of both countries and to Europe at large.

On the one hand – perestroika in the Soviet Union offers unheard-of perspectives for establishing contacts at all levels, and removes obsolete stereotypes, once such a drag on the development of bilateral relations. On the other hand, an objective necessity is felt in West Germany to continue the fruitful dialogue with the Soviet Union and establish normal, if not goodneighbourly relations with our country. This applies to all spheres – the economy, culture, joint scientific ventures, but military and political issues remain a priority. Different opinions notwithstanding, the objective realities existing in Europe and the developing disarmament process leave the Federal Republic only one choice – to try and seek national security through dialogue with Moscow, through reciprocal concesssions and lowering the level of military confrontation. All this is increasingly important, as West Germany is the country with the highest level of military presence per square mile of its territory in Europe.

The Chancellor's political luggage

An experienced politician knows the value of the press. Not long ago the mass media of both countries spared no effort in depicting the other side in accordance with the "enemy image." Today the time has come for a more thorough analysis of the intentions and opinions of the negotiating partners. In other words, it's time to build mutual confidence. Perhaps this was the reason for Chancellor Kohl's generosity when he set aside two hours of his time to meet Soviet journalists.

The Chancellor's interview was no rehearsal for his formal speech at a Kremlin reception; rather he was just trying to share his views with us.

First of all he considered his Moscow visit in the entire context of Russian-Soviet-West German relations. What we need is an honest account of the history of Soviet-German relations. This history has known not only wars but great spiritual rapprochement, and cultural and economic links. The 20th century, Kohl believes, has been especially dramatic: it witnessed the first world war and the Weimar Republic, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and the second

Helmut Kohl and his wife Hannelore at home

Photo from Stern magazine (F.R.G.)

world war, the German invasion of the Soviet Union... The Russians in Berlin in 1945. Nothing should be left off.

Secondly, the Chancellor believes that the present moment is especially favourable for continuing the mutual dialogue at a qualitatively new level. There are imporant changes in the Soviet Union. These changes have boosted the popularity of the new Soviet leader and confidence in his policies.

What concrete agreements are to be reached in Moscow? The already initialled agreements on environment protection and cooperation in building and maintaining nuclear reactors, and cooperation in the ship-building industry will be signed in the course of the visit. It is desirable to expand academic exchange programmes, and conclude a treaty on cooperation between major universities in the two countries. On the eve of the visit there came the sensational news of a possible space flight of a West German astronaut on board a Soviet space vehicle. Many important issues of economic cooperation will also be discussed in Moscow, along with the proposal by West German business circles to set up training courses for Soviet managers.

But the greatest expectations, as can easily be seen from the local press, are linked with the political talks the Chancellor is going to have with the Soviet leaders. Their success will serve the stability of our relations, the interests of European security. After all, progress in this sphere will largely affect the further development of bilateral cooperation in all other fields.

Genscher's position

After the meeting with the Chancellor, we headed for the Foreign Ministry to interview Hans-Dietrich Genscher. It occurred to us that such a crowded programme could be a reluctant whim on the part of our German hosts. It could also be that the Foreign Minister himself decided to meet Soviet journalists immediately after the interview with the Chancellor, so that we would better understand who really holds the strings of the Ostpolitik inside the Bonn coalition.

Many observers in the F.R.G. noted certain difference between the Chancellor's position and that of his deputy. Genscher is believed to be more realistic in his assessment of European problems, less influenced by traditionally conservative opinions and more sincere in the quest for mutual understanding in the dialogue with Moscow, especially in the domain of security and disarmament.

Genscher was the first to use the notion of "cooperative security," and contributed much to the progress of the Vienna consultations on a mandate for the talks on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. It is he who is mostly heard wishing success to the Soviet policy of reform and calling for a constructive responce to Soviet peace initiatives.

The West German Foreign Minister sees the future of Europe in terms of cooperation and constructive competition between the two systems. He thinks the time has come to elaborate the architectural project of Europe based on an all-European dialogue. He ascribes key importance to relations with the Soviet Union, aware of the responsibility of the two countries not only before their peoples but before the entire Old World. That is why bilateral contacts and constructive dialogue in all spheres, especially in those relating to military and political issues, are assuming increasing importance. Even if the final decision rests with the two alliances, says Genscher, this shouldn't prevent us discussing security problems on a bilateral basis. For example, the question of balance in conventional armaments is primarily a matter between the U.S.S.R. and the F.R.G.

Few people probably know that it was Genscher who had introduced the "enemy image" into the political language. He did that in order to put an end to it. Replying to questions put by New Times correspondents the Minister said that the abolition of the "enemy image" was just as important as the abolition of superflous arms.

FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL ON:

Relations between the F.R.G. and the U.S.S.R.

In the light of the perestroika and glasnost now under way in your country, we would like to exploit every opportunity for a long-term perspective to our relations based on the provisons of the Moscow treaty.

We could have regular summit meetings in future as well as stepping up contacts between our parliamentarians and all public groups.

Disarmament problems

At future negotiations it seems especially important to translate the mutually accepted need to remove assymmetries in conventional forces into the language of concret eagreements. In doing so we shall be guided by the principle reflected in the INF treaty: the more armaments a side has, the deeper the reduction it undertakes.

Building a "European home"

In this respect neither West nor East is at the starting line. The construction of a "European home" has already begun and, in this sense, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference is both a blue-print and a set of rules and regulations for this home. It is imperative that this all-European process should be developed towards fuller observance of human rights, stronger cooperation and security achieved not through confrontation, but through joint effort.

(From replies to questions by Soviet journalists)

A small breach in the mammoth budget

On the eve of the meeting in Moscow, it was announced in Bonn that the Chancellor will be accompanied by the Minister of Defence. Rupert Scholz responded to our request for a meeting very promptly, as becomes a military man. The next morning, at 7.30 a.m., we were expected for a working breakfast in the Ministry of Defence. We, reserve lieutenants in the Soviet Army, sat in company with Bundeswehr colonels and generals who listened attentively to their civilian superior.

Rupert Scholz, a 50-year-old lawyer, fromer senator for West Berlin and a member of the North Atlantic assembly, has been leading the Federal Military Department for five months. He is an experienced politician and understands the necessity for serious talks with the Soviet Union. Much still gives him cause for concern, for example the still secret Soviet military expenditure, and the provisions of the Soviet military doctrine dealing with "combat operations on hostile territory." But there are many inspiring signs – first of all the Soviet Union's preparedness for sincere dialogue. Scholz thinks that the very fact of direct contacts is extremely significant – you can see your opponent, and get first hand information. We listened to Rupert Scholz over breakfast which, we hope, was not a heavy burden on the Bundeswehr's budget.

* * *

The expectations and hopes pinned on the Moscow visit may seem excessive. However, there is no doubt that since the end of WW II possibilities for Soviet-West German contacts have never been so favourable. The experience of past decades enequivocally demonstrates that relations between the U.S.S.R. and the F.R.G. can be decisive for the situation on the continent. The sooner both countries perceive each other not as opponents but as partners and companions in the same boat, the easier it will be to negotiate and construct a new peaceful "Ordnung," as they say in Bonn.

Alexei Bukalov,
Nikita Zholkver

Bonn, 17 October

Towards cooperation and trust

Thinking in terms of crises has always aggravated the relations between our two countries. Some said that capitalism was drawing towards its inevitable end, that it was stagnant and would therefore soon cease to exist, while others launched crusades against communism.

In this interview for New Times, **Professor Hans-Adolf Jacobsen** of Bonn University examines relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany.

New Times. Do you believe that the awareness of interdependence is a substantial part of new thinking?

Jacobsen. I would certainly go along with that. The renunciation of dogmas is another important part of it. Mikhail Gorbachev put it very well when he said that there can be no monopoly on the ultimate truth. We must learn from each other, and it is only natural that everyone wants to find the best possible formula. We have no way of knowing how world history should develop. World history is open to competition between East and West and individual countries. The "German question" is in the same category, because it is an open question.

N.T. What is your understanding of the "German question."

Jacobsen. It is fairly easy to define, and not just because it is defined in the Constitution of the F.R.G. My understanding of it is the possibility of the peaceful union of all Germans. I am sure that Helmut Kohl will be discussing this in Moscow. I, for one, believe that this is not necessarily a matter of forming a single German state. But the awareness of common roots must one day prevail.

N.T. Does it not appear to you that whenever the "German question" is raised, along with the issue of "reunification," the past, to which there can be no return, is offered as an example for the future of Europe?

Jacobsen. I thought you'd start arguing immediately.

N.T. We shall certainly argue, the more so as this stand appears to run counter to the spirit of the times, involving as it does a third nation, the sovereign German Democratic Republic, in the framework of our bilateral relations.

Jacobsen. We must be aware of the following two aspects. There can be no doubt at all that the concept of the law-governed state provides for the observance of the Constitution...

N.T. But constitutions are written by people, aren't they?

Jacobsen. Wait a minute. If we are to be absolutely honest, and that is what we want to be, I am sure, we must make it absolutely clear that stability and peace in Europe now depend on the existence of two German states with two different social and political systems. But clearly we are unable to say what will happen a hundred or five hundred years from now. I don't want to be misunderstood. Dealing with the "German question" is a matter for the remote future. We must deal with more pressing problems today.

N.T. Would it not be more useful to interpret the "German question" as the question that was raised in Potsdam, that is, what must be done to make sure that war never begins on German soil again?

Jacobsen. I would include that in the "German question" as well. Both German states must be guarantors of peace, and contribute actively to the construction of a safer world, both theoretically and practically. It is the third component of new thinking, to my mind, that it is now generally appreciated that, in spite of the fact that we belong to different social and political systems, we must be more tolerant and aware of our shared interests. This would certainly help us strengthen intergovernment relations as we work together to build a common European home. It is the Marxist view that society is class-based. We proceed from the existence of social strata. But most important of all are the universal humanitarian interests of various nations.

N.T. That is what the deideologizing of international relations is all about...

Jacobsen. That is correct and it is of decisive importance for the growth of trust, which is the foundation of our common European home.

N.T. You have defined three coordinates that determine the space in which new thinking operates: awareness of interdependence, tolerance of each other, and the renunciation of outmoded dogmas. There has always been a need to implement these principles, but the demand has very often not been met by the supply. The history of Soviet-West German relations shows that both sides have managed to arrive at identity of interests in one way or another. There are plenty of examples. The most relevant of all is the policy towards the East followed by the F.R.G. in the 1970s. History cannot be rewritten, however, it is no secret that the Christian Democratic Union now in office was then opposed to that policy.

Jacobsen. The opposition of the CDU/CSU to the ostpolitic of the SDP–Free Democratic Party coalition is a fact. Regrettably, the situation that was emerging in the 1970s was erroneously assessed. The signing of the Helsinki Final Act revealed enormous resources. But the response was that if we open up there will be no stopping the Soviet Union from taking over the whole of Europe.

N.T. According to Chancellor Kohl, relations with the Soviet Union are of crucial importance. What should this be taken to mean?

Jacobsen. Let us recall the Latin maxim: "Pacta sunt servanda" but there is more to it than that. The year 1988 has shown the leaders of the CDU/CSU that normalizing relations with the Soviet Union was correct and useful.

The new quality of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the F.R.G. was taken into account when the decision was made on the forthcoming visit to Moscow of Chancellor Kohl. Although our countries belong to two different military-political alliances and we have our partners in



HANS-ADOLF JACOBSEN is a well-known West German historian and political scientist. He has written a number of fundamental studies on the history of WW II, the European process, and the F.R.G.'s Ostpolitik.

the West and you have yours in the East, we are aware of our mutual dependence.

The determining factor in the growth of trust resides, in my view, in the steps taken by the Soviet Union, such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the INF treaty, readiness to accept verification in arms control, the new nature of relations within the Warsaw Treaty and the greater independence and self-reliance of its members.

N.T. Does it not appear to you that qualitative change is on the way within NATO as well, especially with respect to such vital issues as reductions in conventional weapons? We have often heard the argument that the F.R.G. would take stronger action if NATO allowed it to. Does it not appear to you that the Federal Republic could have an independent role in decision making?

Jacobsen. For one thing, it is absolutely clear that the Federal Republic depends on its partners where its security is concerned. Secondly, we are part of an alliance where the principles of democracy are of decisive importance. That is why, in order to induce our partners to alter their stand, we must first pursuade them to do so. There is a good chance that we shall be able to do so. The view is gaining currency in the F.R.G. that we face no threat from the East. It may come as a surprise to you, but every opinion poll indicates that there is greater trust in the Soviet Union now. Under the Konrad Adenauer government, thirty per cent of respondents said they perceived no threat from the U.S.S.R. In 1988 the figure rose to 70-75 per cent. In other words, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify military programmes. Alternatives are being suggested. For instance, the Social Democratic defence expert in the Bundestag, Andreas von Bülow, has tabled a document on setting up military structures incapable of offensive action.

N.T. We were pleasantly surprised by the contribution of the West German government to progress towards the INF treaty. Does this mean that the Federal Republic can after all act independently and counter to NATO's position?

Jacobsen. The treaty was made possible by new thinking and the revision of many foreign policy attitudes by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. Their personal acquaintance also played an important part.

It would be an exaggeration to believe, in line with the customary formula, that the forthcoming meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev will open up a new era in our relations. That era was inaugurated in 1970 with the signing of the Moscow treaty, but there can be no doubt that the visit of the Federal Chancellor to Moscow will have wide-ranging results and give the growth of mutual trust a fresh impetus. Many more pages have yet to be written in the history of our relations.

It is well known, for instance, that there is considerable potential for economic cooperation, and it would be useful for both countries to take it up and use it. It would be useful for perestroika and it would help us combat unemployment and create jobs. If I am not mistaken our two countries have already set up 16 joint ventures.

I don't think we should confine ourselves to the economy alone. We could join forces in dealing with ecological problems and we certainly need cultural exchanges, an inexhaustible source of knowledge, inspiration and discovery. I am sure that visitors to the exhibition of the work of the avant-garde artist Günter Uecker in Moscow, and those who saw the exhibition dedicated to the millennium of Russian art in Schleswig and the performances of the Soviet circus in West Germany, will share that view.

The policy of easing tensions and new thinking must not be confined to the minds of leading politicians. We must educate younger advocates of that policy, and this calls for the widest possible contacts between our young people. We must not forget, though, that wider contacts depend on concrete steps in the area of security.

N.T. It is also true that the implementation of these and other programmes requires political will and political decisions as well as political consultations between our governments. Given the will of the upper echelons grassroots contacts will widen freely.

Jacobsen. That is not always so. For instance, the reduction of conventional weapons has not proved easy. The two sides are committed to different views on the matter, and this is a sticking point at the Vienna talks on the reduction of troops and conventional weapons in Central Europe. The talks have been in progress for years.

N.T. This magazine recently opposed these talks in no uncertain terms (NT No. 28). After all, they have been going on now for fifteen years. We received a message from the chief Soviet delegate at the talks, Yuri Kashlev, who argued against some of our views, albeit with a great deal of diplomatic tact but, be that as it may, these talks are now best forgotten.

Jacobsen. It might be a good idea if a new set of talks were opened with a view to reducing armed forces and conventional weapons on the entire territory from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals.

N.T. The new approach to these issues manifested itself during the Soviet-American summit in Moscow. It concerned the three stages of the abolition of imbalances and asymmetries in Europe, and the transition to creating a non-offensive structure of weapons and armed forces, after they have been dramatically reduced. The idea was not only to state figures but also to verify them by means of inspections.

Jacobsen. There are not a few influential people in West Germany who would be satisfied to see these proposals made, but we cannot accept them without consultations with our partners in NATO, and that is a major source of problems. Britain is committed to one stand and France, which is not integrated into NATO's military wing, is committed to another. The Americans are pursuing their own interests. How can we convince our allies? Perhaps if the Soviet leadership succeeds in carrying through the great experiment it has undertaken, they will budge...

N.T. Is waiting enough?

Jacobsen. We do not intend to sit on the fence. We wish you success and believe we can help you in one way or another. We, too, have problems, dealing with which a perestroika of our own would certainly be helpful.

Interviewers: LEV BEZYMENSKY and KONSTANTIN ISAKOV



Drawing by Andrei Ayoshin

QUOTATIONS

Mieczyslaw Rakowski,
Chairman of the
Council of Ministers,
Polish People's
Republic

■ It is not true that Poland is doomed to suffer from stagnation and hopeless lack of progress and become a land of disappointed and resentful people. It is not true that nothing worthwhile can be made in Poland. This is a fallacious notion. At the same time, it is correct that Poland is still in no position to cope with the aftermath of the socio-economic crisis, which is evident in almost all spheres of life. Many people cannot make ends meet. The government will do all it can to make life easier for the people and remove whatever causes difficulties and justified discontent.

During my meetings with people from all walks of life over the last two weeks, I was asked about the so-called Philosophy of Government. My answer to these questions was that the new government would get down to work firmly bent on upholding what still remains of Stalinism. We shall create the elements of a democratic, self-governed and modern Poland. We want a socialism under which every upright patriot can feel good, have a say in the affairs of his factory and neighbourhood and be taken account of by the local and central authorities...

Our foreign and home policy will be characterized by openness. The more forces we succeed in mustering, the more pluralism and freedom we shall have.



Drawing by Vsevolod Arsenyev

Carla Anne Robbins
(U.S. News and World Report)

■ In Chile, democracy has triumphed (after the referendum of October 5 – **Ed.**), but its victory is by no means final. There is a danger that the victory will turn the opposition's head and its gains will be lost in internal squabbles which could result in a split. The opposition might also put too much pressure on the ruling junta thus triggering off a new wave of repressive retaliation.

The opposition entered the referendum well prepared. Two monitors were placed by each of the 22,000 ballot boxes. Hundreds of foreign observers were invited as well. The military were the main force to contribute to the fairness of the referendum. Indignant at Pinochet's request for another term, they wanted to see a younger civilian candidate in office.

Naim al-Ashab,
Member of
the Politburo,
Central Committee,
Palestine Communist
Party

■ It is not enough to recognize Israel's right to existence and for Israel to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization. We also want our rights to the formation of an independent state and to self-determination recognized. If an international conference is held, and an agreement reached on these issues, we shall thus recognize the Jewish state and the right to security in the region for all, Israel included.

Frank Carlucci,
the U.S. Secretary of
Defence

■ We must stay on the path of strong leadership and strong partnership that President Reagan has forged over the last eight years. We must not cast aside what we have all worked so hard and sacrificed so much to build. America must remain strong militarily to resist the forces of aggression wherever they may appear. The future of our great nation demands no less.

Kim Dae Jung,
a leader of the opposition (South Korea)

■ I think it possible to promote "northern diplomacy" significantly with regard to communist countries. At the same time, it is necessary to maintain a balance in South Korea's relations with Japan, the U.S. and other friendly countries. The successful completion of the Olympics gave greater confidence to the South Korean people. The trend towards democratization is irreversible.

When reforms falter



Were the outbursts of violence in Algeria early this October so unexpected after a steep price rise?

I once observed something similar in Cairo in 1977, after the Egyptian government had raised the prices of staple foods. This triggered off strikes by steelworkers in Helwan. Security forces were sent in against them, but were stopped by barricades made from burning car tyres. Meanwhile mass rioting had begun in Cairo. People took to the streets burning cars, overturning trams, smashing shopwindows and breaking into offices. I was lucky to be able to rescue my son from a besieged Soviet school. But in the street where the New Times office is, the crowds were attacking, looting and burning nightclubs. I remember a shabbily dressed woman carrying an expensive electric guitar, and a group of youngsters shouting: "What are you doing, believers?" as they snatched bottles of looted whisky from people's hands and broke them on the pavement.

Can the present developments in Algeria be compared with what happened in Egypt under Anwar Sadat? At that time Egypt was caught up in rapid change as a result of the open-door policy – the revival of private capital, influx of foreign investment and emergence of a multi-party system.

In Algeria, 1988 also saw major changes, but unlike in Egypt, the changes were not directed at reviving the capitalist order of things, but at restructuring the existing one. Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid has admitted as much: "This is a purely organizational matter, not linked with ideology or the country's basic option."

Still, analogies do suggest themselves. In both cases the drastic reforms were in response to a crisis. And in both cases disturbances were caused by raised food prices.

Economic difficulties

Crisis had been brewing in Algeria for some years. Oil was one of the main catalysts in the process. Oil is an exceedingly dangerous product in this day and age. If you raise prices, you hit the economies of developing countries that do not have oil. If you cut them, you strike at the economies of oil-exporting countries. Algeria belongs to the latter category.

The country's biggest resource is natural gas. Gas prices are linked with those of oil. Algeria's gas resources are the fourth largest in the world. Liquefied gas sales account for 60 per cent of the country's export earnings. Other resources are difficult of access and require major capital investment. Therefore, when fuel prices began to plummet in the first half of the eighties, Algeria's economy sustained heavy damage. This was particularly true of the current year. European buyers of Algerian gas demanded a cut in prices. Algeria had to accede to the demands because cheaper gas was available on the world market.

Difficulties in marketing raw materials affected the whole economy. Because of the loss of export earnings, Algeria was short of money with which to import industrial goods and food (about 30 per cent of the hard currency goes on food imports).

Agriculture is unable to feed the country, as a large part of its territory is lifeless desert. Of the 7.5 million hectares of ag-

Chronicle of events

From our own correspondent in Algeria

The first week of October was the most difficult for Algeria in the past 26 years. Now that it is over, it is hard to imagine that fires raged and roaring crowds smashed shop windows in the beautiful rue Didouche Mourad, the favourite haunt of evening strollers.

Signs of trouble were apparent on the evening of **October 4.** There were huge queues of cars at filling stations. Petrol prices had been raised, but this was the first time during my stay that there had been a shortage of petrol.

Leaflets were being distributed in the city calling for a general strike on October 5. People in the streets were angrily discussing the price rises.

Rioting began on the **night of October 5.** This was more than just a strike. The following day the capital was seethin Crowds – mostly schoolchildren gathered. They were joined by u employed. They gave vent to their ang not just in words, but in deeds. Tl crowds acted spontaneously but delibe ately. The targets of attacks, arson a looting were ministries, government fices, companies and shops, post and surance offices and public transport. T raging crowd was destroying its own ci Private shops were looted.

On October 6, I saw a depressing p ture: burnt out cars in the streets, mu lated buses, smashed public pho booths, shattered windows and gutt houses. All shops were closed. A curf was imposed and in two of the capita suburbs a state of emergency declare

ricultural land, only 250,000 are irrigated. In a bid to improve the situation, the government set up self-managing socialist farms. But the experiment failed to produce tangible results. The land belonging to the self-managing farms has now been distributed among peasants in allotments of up to 2 hectares. Peasants farm them independently or form small cooperatives of 6-9 people.

Population explosion

Another challenge facing the country is the population explosion. According to the Algerian press, the population almost doubled in the period between the first census in 1966 and the third in 1987: from 12 to 23 million. The population is expected to have risen to 34 million by the year 2000. The republic's government did not seriously address the problem until 1983, when social tensions had reached dangerous proportions. A national population control programme was adopted. But it was very slow in getting off the ground. It is only this year that Algerian television has introduced a programme on family planning in which TV viewers can get answers to such questions as: how can family planning control population growth? How can we plan the birth rate? Where is one to get contraceptives? Some progress has been made. While in 1977 there were 74 children per every ten women, the figure has now dropped to 53.

The under-twenties constitute 57 per cent of the population. As a result, only 20 per cent of the population are economically active. Young people face the problem of employment. Until the early eighties the employment situation was satisfactory. Today there is a large gap between the number of jobs created annually (115,000) and the number of contenders for them (180,000). By the year 2000 Algeria will need 4,000,000 jobs and twice as much housing as today. It will need many more schools, hospitals, foodstuffs and so on.

The reforms launched in Algeria at the end of last year have officially been proclaimed a forced measure aimed at rectifying economic errors and miscalculations.

The aftermath of street riots in Algiers.

The IBRD loan

The reform is designed to give greater autonomy to enterprises, overhaul agriculture, introduce a new planning system, promote decentralization and offer new incentives to improve the economy, management and control. For a start, 100-150 industrial enterprises from a total number of 1,600 have been given autonomy. Their work will now be judged by profitability and self-financing.

Looking for a way out of the crisis, the Algerian government turned early this year to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and borrowed 200 million dollars. The IBRD is a no-nonsense highly profitable enterprise which offers loans on harsh terms. Whether at the IBRD's instigation or not is hard to say, but over the past two weeks prices in Algeria have risen dramatically. That measure was evidently the straw that broke the camel's back. Opponents of changes in Algeria were quick to take advantage of the situation.

It is not only Algerians who stand to learn from the developments in the country. Drastic reform is a delicate matter. It must be brought home to the people that the reform does offer a way out of a crisis, that it is to improve their lives, if only slightly. In Algeria this did not happen.

Dmitry Zgersky

Photo from The International Herald Tribune

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here are disturbances in Oran, Béchar, nnaba and Tiaret. Troops and security orces have occupied the streets of Alliers.

From talks with neighbours I gathered hat most of them did not approve of the oters. "Of course, we have a lot of probms," people said, "but this is no way to olve them."

On October 8, Information Minister achir Rouis called a press conference r foreign newsmen and spoke of the difculties the country was experiencing.

On October 10, President Chadli endjedid gave a televised address to e nation. He said that a package of weeping political reforms would soon put up for nationwide discussion and changes made in the country's Constitution. But, stressed the President, the measures recommended by the leadership cannot be implemented in a situation of anarchy and sabotage.

On October 12, the President lifted the state of emergency in the capital and its suburbs and ended the curfew. Repairs are under way and the streets are being cleaned up.

The President has announced that a national referendum on the proposed changes in the Constitution will be held. Algerians will decide on the new structure of the legislature and the democratization of the political system.

Evgeny Bobrov

A new rapprochement?

The Soviet Foreign Minister has returned from Paris to Moscow in good humour.



During his visit to the Soviet Union, President Mitterrand will watch the launching of a Soviet-French crew on a space mission from the Baikonur cosmodrome. The members of the crew – Alexander Serebrov, Alexander Victorenko and Michel Tognini – are now preparing for the flight.
TASS photo

It should be said right away that in the past few years Soviet-French relations have been in a period of stagnation, if not regression. Something must have happened, then, during the three days Eduard Shevardnadze spent in Paris, from October 10 to 12. Complete reappraisal of former policies? Tactical manoeuvres? A new rapprochement?

It is doubtful if Eduard Shevardnadze and Roland Dumas could have radically changed the situation in the few hours of the official visit thanks solely to the diplomacy of smiles. Perestroika in Soviet-French relations seems to have been for a long time ripening. The meetings and talks of the Soviet Foreign Minister with French government and political leaders made the new trends clearly apparent.

It will be recalled that exactly three years ago Mikhail Gorbachev went to France on an official visit, his first trip to the West in his capacity as CPSU General Secretary. During that visit, the Soviet leader came out with the idea of Europe as the common home of the peoples who live there. I was in France in those autumn days of 1985, and remember that Mikhail Gorbachev made a strong impression on the minds and hearts of the French people.

But no diplomatic breakthrough was made then in Soviet-French relations. Moscow's new thinking was received with interest, but without much trust. Nevertheless, a shift was apparent. Moscow noted the evolution in the attitude of French ruling circles, particularly the Socialists, to the Soviet Union. It also welcomed the arrival last autumn of a group of prominent statesmen and politicians who had decided to get first-hand knowledge of perestroika. Initiative-87 was sponsored by the friendship societies of the two countries. A better understanding of life in another country is an important, though inadequate, stage.

A self-critical approach to its foreign policy and a revision of priorities enabled Moscow to show greater understanding of France's views and the opinions of all other European partners of the Soviet Union. Some of the obstacles have been removed by the very course of perestroika.

France's interest in the Soviet reforms has developed into a search for dialogue. The views of both countries on the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe and on a number of subjects discussed at the Vienna follow-up meeting to the Helsinki conference have come closer. Their points of view have also drawn nearer on the Soviet proposal to hold in Moscow a 35-nation conference on humanitarian aspects of cooperation. It was Paris that first hinted that the West is prepared to give up its whim of discussing human rights in any place but Moscow.

Paris has renounced the idea of getting possession of chemical weapons before the other great powers have destroyed their stockpiles of chemical weapons, and has proposed holding an international conference on the issue. This would be an important stage on the way to the abolition of these barbaric means of mass annihilation. Talks on chemical disarmament between experts of the two countries will resume in Paris next month.

The speech delivered by Eduard Shevardnadze after his talks in UNESCO reflected the Kremlin's present stand on humanitarian issues. Unfortunately, the French press took no notice of his call to abandon an excessively ideological approach to the work of UNESCO (an approach which was, incidentally, also characteristic of the Soviet Union), and to political issues in general.

I think this call found practical embodiment in Soviet-French contacts. During Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Paris both sides held joint press briefings, a measure unusual to Soviet practice. Another novelty was the work of committees led by high-ranking diplomats. This helped to make possible a leap forward in the discussion of burning issues in international life and bilateral relations.

Both sides agreed for the first time to hold special consultations on information problems. Lastly, one further proof of the innovative policy was the agreement in principle to open cultural centres in Moscow and Paris, an idea the French have been advancing for a long time, but without response.

The implementation of this idea will probably become part of a cultural agreement to be signed during a summit meeting. The possibility for this will appear at the end of November, when President Mitterrand will arrive in the Soviet Union on a working visit. Next spring CPSU General Secretary and Soviet head of state will pay an official visit to France.

For the first time since 1981, Soviet-French relations have entered a stage of stable growth. This has been made possible by, among other things, the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington and the active policy of London, Bonn and Rome. With a certain delay, the Quai d'Orsay has reverted to its traditionally trailblazing role in Eastern Europe. While not belittling the importance of its dialogue with other Western partners, Moscow attaches great importance to its ties with Paris.

During his stay in Paris, Eduard Shevardnadze revived the forgotten term "privileged relations." True, I personally understand it as a hope for the future rather than a statement of present-day reality.

Alexander Ignatov

Global ecoshock

Yuri Svirezhev, Dr.Sc. (Phys.-Math.)

"Beauty will not save the world if the world divorces culture from material production, science, technology, education and other spheres of social activity," said Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris. Ecologists are more aware of this than anyone else. They have been talking for a long time of the need for a new moral frame of reference for a unified ecology of nature, culture and reason.

The bicentenary of the American revolution was celebrated comparatively recently, and next year we shall be marking the bicentenary of the French Revolution. The principles of modern democracy and the notion of human rights were advanced two hundred years ago. Over that period, 6-8 generations have come and gone.

Catastrophe could occur even in peacetime. We are 30-50 years from the critical point.

The individual is viewed in the light of these ideas as free to live, move and construct the history of the world.

Two hundred years ago an individual could make his own choice, aware that this would not have global repercussions. The world was disunited and the power of technology was low. Even the ecological effects of the two world wars (this is where it would be – for the first time – quite appropriate to talk of the ecology of nature and the ecology of culture) were localized. Today a decision on the part of an individual could lead to nuclear war, global ecological catastrophe and the extermination of human civilization.

The scientific and technological revolution has created a situation where the social structure of the world today and mankind as a biological species could be wiped out. The scientific and technological revolution was not accompanied by a moral and spiritual evolution of the human race that could have generated protective mechanisms to rule out the possibility of a catastrophe. The new situation cannot be controlled relying on the principles of traditional democracy laid down two hundred years ago.

Ecologically reasonable notions of development and environment protection are, as a rule, unprofitable if viewed from the standpoint of local and transient interests. It can hardly be expected that the workings of today's economic structures, international structures among them, will be beneficial to the environment. A different attitude can and must be adopted toward the problem: however, if the classic range of human rights no longer suffices, mankind must draw up social guarantees of respect for human **ecological rights** and the right of the individual to a normal natural environment.

Academician Dmitry Likhachev has coined the phrase "the ecology of culture." Ecology means "the science of home-making." Home is not merely a shelter, but a place where we meet our families, read books, listen to music and watch TV. That is why the notion of ecology also covers the physical, material, intellectual and spiritual environment.

Man has long ceased to be one of the millions upon millions of biological species whose evolution accounts for an insignificant fraction of the overall evolution of the biosphere. Today man is nature's equal partner in the global transformation of the Earth, and we must now consider the joint evolution of man and the biosphere.

For as long as nuclear weapons extst, there remains the probability of a nuclear war and the death of civilization as a result of nuclear winter and other effects of nuclear war. It has been demonstrated that nuclear weapons are not the only potential causes of global catastrophe. Nuclear weapons are a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the end of our civilization. Nuclear winter is a possible consequence of the technogenic risks taken by our technological civilization.

The large-scale use of conventional weapons will lead to fires in cities and cause the destruction of nuclear-power and chemical facilities. The end result will be ecological catastrophe on a global scale.

Ecological shock could occur even in peacetime if the trend towards uncontrolled, anti-ecological and egotistical development persists. The danger of that trend is that negative phenomena are accumulating gradually and may not be noticed in time, while the ecological calamity itself will occur comparatively quickly. The point of no return may be reached long before the actual calamity.

The computing centre of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences has developed a model of global processes in the biosphere. Its estimate is that we are 30-50 years from the critical point.

The most important question is the criterion for selecting a line of action. If we proceed from the view that expediency is all-important, we shall have to be sure of our frame of reference. Who is to decide what is in the best interests of society? Is this the responsibility of scientists, politicians, or moralists? We learn from history that on many occasions decisions prompted by what appeared to be quite reasonable considerations have led to devastating consequences for both nature and culture.

The human race is facing two equally imortant tasks today, preserving the ecology of nature and preserving the ecology of culture.

The International Council of Scientific Unions has sponsored project Global Change, an attempt to model the future of the biosphere as a physical, chemical and biological system. What about the ecology of culture? Who can predict where the co-evolution of man and the biosphere will eventually lead? Where are we heading? An answer to this question that bedevils our civilization can only be arrived at if the intellectual potential of the entire international community is applied in seeking it. There is an organization that could coordinate the effort. It is UNESCO. The critical point is not far off and we are running out of time.

Jinnah's Masoleum in Karachi: the Founder is revered, his successors blamed

Dictatorship in ruins

The rate of democratization seems astonishing, but whether the course of events is not to be reversed remains an open question

Life in Pakistan is somewhat monotonous. Work and prayer are the two most important occupations of a Pakistani. Television and videos offer either noisy American thrillers or shy Pakistani love. The TV screen is as decent as a mosque. Illustrated weeklies do not carry playboy pictures for men or gossip columns for women. Politics seems to be the only accepted amusement for an orthodox Muslim, and power is the only temptation that is not sinful.

Heroes and the crowd

We are at an election rally in Rawalpindi. Women sit, men remain standing. Long pipes produce a hoarse tune, there is the dull throbbing of a solitary drum. It's 40 degrees Centigrade, and the only relief for thousands of parched throats is a weak rusty fountain. The rally was scheduled for 3 p.m., but the first speaker only takes the floor at 5. "Bismillah al-Rahim al-Rahman" (in the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful...) – intones the prayer. Then comes a quick recital of history with only three names mentioned: Mohammad the Prophet, innah the founder of Pakistan, and the Leader (the name depends on the current political situation). Here all election speeches sound alike. Several slogans are put forward without any particular enthusiasm and immediately taken up by the "chanting group" (a familiar institution in this country) which starts to repeat them innumerable times, dancing as they do so.

As a representative of an independent organ of the Soviet press, I stroll along the stand intended for guests of honour, when all of a sudden I hear a most unpolitical yell. Burly fellows from the party's bodyguard unit have fallen on a rag-clad man and started to beat him up with canes. After someone from the stand has pulled them up, the attackers stop the beating reluctantly. The man gets up, shakes the dust from his rags and, spitting blood, climbs up the wooden staircase.

It was a mistake. They told me later that the man in rags was known locally for his

Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto are sure they'll win

Concluded. For the earlier instalments see our issues 40 and 41.

largely unorthodox thinking. Endowed with immense wealth, he eats leftover food, sleeps on boards and rubs shoulders with the poor. He was unfortunate enough not to change his dress before heading for the rally and the guards didn't recognize him. However, the man didn't seem to mind. He was sitting among the guests of honour, quipping to his offenders: you can't tell friend from foe. In this part of the world, violence harms the body but not the soul.

More and more people take the floor; a mullah, a youth, an elder, a woman, who cannot already divert the crowd's attention from politics. Allah, Pakistan, Mohammad, Pakistan, Jinnah, Pakistan, the Leader, Pakistan...

The chanting group knows its business, the crowd has been roused and precisely at that moment the Candidate himself appears on the rostrum. After that a few words in a strained voice are enough to send the crowd into ecstasy.

Cards on the table

The rate of democratization in Pakistan seems astounding to a man from a country where a hundred miles is no distance, and a hundred years no time. The Ziaists are mourning dictatorship as yesterday they mourned the dictator. The authoritarian regime is changing its façade. The desicion to call elections on a non-party basis and dissolve the National and Provincial Assemblies taken by the regime's architect has been ruled invalid by the country's Supreme Court. The incumbent authorities have found themselves outlawed. The only reason the Court has not ordered their resignation is the forthcoming election scheduled for November 16 and 19.

But the opposition is not satisfied. "After General Zia's departure from the political scene, his puppets must go as well," says Abdul Wali Khan, one of the leaders of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, an eccentric aristocrat-cum-democrat. But the Movement itself is not today the most left-wing force in the country. It has been announced in Karachi that the Socialist Party of Pakistan, the Communist Party of Pakistan and the Pakistani Worker-Peasant Party have, together with minor political groups, decided to join their efforts under the umbrella of the Left Democratic Front. Only a month ago the idea of Marxists' appearing on the political scene was inconceivable.

The main contenders for the parliamentary majority are the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy and the Ziaists: the Pakistan Muslim League (the Fida Muhammad Khan faction) and the Pakistan National People's Party. Fida's men have a damaged reputation: they are mostly ministers and governors in the Zia regime. They have power, government funds, control over television and radio – the most potent propaganda weapons in a largely illiterate country. But the opposition to this faction is considerable. On the contrary, Ghulam Mustafa Jafoi – the leader of Pakistan National People's Party – is a shrewd politician. He dared argue with General Zia and is very popular with businessmen and technocrats. As the best man for a compromise, Ghulam Mustafa Jafoi has a chance of becoming Prime Minister even if his bloc does not win an absolute majority.

The Ziaists favour the status quo both in foreign and domestic policy, but they have been forced to abandon their authoritarian methods. Their main opponents have not yet clearly defined their objectives. Elections in Pakistan are a contest of tactics, not strategy. The main thing here is to secure power. That is why Social Democrats are siding with feudal khans and dissidents with fundamentalists. And everyone is currying favours with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the ruling military, for the ultimate decision may still lie with them and not with the electorate.

That must be the reason for the more restrained and obscure statements by Benazir Bhutto, who, together with her mother Nusrat Bhutto, heads the Pakistan People's Party, the leading force in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. After all, the establishment must know that the daughter of the tempestuous Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is not going to rock the boat.

Even those who are now calling Zia's regime infernal would not go so far as to say that Bhutto's conduct in office was impeccable. This applies not only to the alleged murder of a political rival, for

رائے پتی پر
مہر سے نشان لگانے کا طریقہ



A ballot for the illiterate: you stamp the symbol of your choice.

The children of those who built the beautiful city of Islamabad still live in shacks, but even these are not the poorest people in Pakistan

which Bhutto was sentenced to death and refused pardon by Zia. The right still can't forget his attempts to make Pakistan a secular state, his "soft spot" for the Soviet Union, reduction of the armed forces and setting up of a provincial security service, which allegedly undermined the precarious national unity. The left resent Bhutto's abuse of power, human rights violations, shadowing opposition leaders, persecution of critically-minded journalists. And no one would ever commend the policy of nationalization initiated by Bhutto which resulted in unheard-of corruption and stagnation in the economy.

The weaknesses of both the main contenders are playing into the hands of the third election alliance. The main force here is the Pakistan Muslim League (the Junejo faction) and the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (Solidarity Party). The alliance's banner is former Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, and its brain – Mohammed Asghar Khan, a retired Air Force marshal.

I had the opportunity to meet both leaders in Islamabad. They are determined to make Pakistan a prosperous Islamic democracy with equal opportunities for all, no exploitation and a just economic system. Asghar Khan spoke bitterly of the impasse in which the poor have found themselves, of the necessity to hand land over to peasants and provide everyone with tolerable living conditions. Junejo recalled his time as Prime Minister and emphasized his contribution to the signing of the Geneva accords. He said he supported the political settlement in Afghanistan and was going to promote it.

Mohammad Khan Junejo reminisces

The onlookers

What a nice election programme. But that of Benazir Bhutto's party is no worse. And those now in power promise Pakistanis neither intolerable living conditions nor incessant war in Afghanistan.

But how can one start implementing these noble plans if their very essence is beyond the understanding of most of the electorate? 76 per cent of Pakistan's population are illiterate, 60 per cent do not have potable water, a third can't afford three meals a day. How can they be involved in the discussion that is today rocking the tiny well-educated elite? It is for the votes of this semi-literate mass that political wars are being fought at the top.

There is a way out. Political platforms are reduced to the terms of the most accessible slogans and every candidate appears under a specific eye-catching image or symbol. These symbols are later multiplied on posters and election broadsheets. Once I heard of a prominent politician who, during the last election campaign, chose a chair as his election symbol. His aides toured the country with chairs in their hands, addressing peasants in remote villages. Chairs were lavishly decorated, and the very look of them was meant to persuade peasants that the candidate was a worthy man, one to rely on.

But undoubtedly an asset for the image-hunters is the tallest man in the world (his height is 2.54 metres), who lives in Pakistan. His presence at the election is a 100 per cent guarantee of success. The simple psychology is: if this giant is voting "for," why should we, ordinary people, be "against"?

It's clear that at this level of public consciousness democracy cannot have deep roots. Actually, the only auspicious factor in this respect is a system of higher education which promotes Western values. To my mind, it was this system that reduced to nought Zia ul-Haq's attempts to create a lasting authoritarian regime. Life in the oppressed country offends the dignity of well-educated Pakistanis and does not make them feel the equals of political and business partners from the Western countries with which Pakistan has close ties. Even the military trying to justify their 25 years in power over a 40-year-old country, speak of the "threat to democracy" from the left or corrupt politicians.

Those whom social standing lands on the margin of big-time politics fall prey to separatist propaganda. Nationalism, more easily than any other ideology, wins the hearts of poorly educated people. Economic and political intricacies are not accessible to everyone, but when it comes to ethnic distinctions, nobody fails to tell a Sindhi from a Muhajir or a Punjabi.

Earlier this month ethnic unrest in Karachi and Hyderabad (Sind Province) took a toll of nearly three hundred lives. The spectre of martial law again haunted the country. Mirza Aslam Beg, the Army Chief of Staff, didn't hesitate to put the blame on "external forces trying to undermine a secure and stable Pakistan." Of course, the military will stop at nothing to counter the "external threat." If a country is torn apart by languages, traditions, cultural and economic distinctions which Islam can no longer hold together, return to dictatorship seems the only way to avoid collapse.

As a citizen of a country living through a most complex process of democratization, I sincerely wish the Pakistanis, to whom I have taken a sincere liking, to embark on an entirely different course of development.

Vladimir Kulistikov
our special correspondent
ISLAMABAD-RAWALPINDI-
KARACHI-MOSCOW

Photos from newspaper Dawn (Pakistan), by E. Alexandrov and by the author

Sell fridges, not MiGs

Rostislav Zolotarev

Gloomy thoughts on the arms trade

The international air show at Farnborough in Britain produced a political sensation, as for the first time the U.S.S.R. showed an air force plane there, the MiG-29 frontline fighter. Neither the fact itself, nor the plane's merits were overlooked by the media abroad. The consensus was that both the exhibiting of a war plane at Farnborough and the demonstration of sophisticated military technology to a delegation from the U.S. Defence Department led by Defence Secretary Frank Carlucci, who was in the Soviet Union at about the same time, were a clear indication of greater Soviet openness, or glasnost, in the military sphere.

This is indeed a noteworthy and welcome event. Glasnost is essential for confidence.

Yet one of the epithets used by the Soviet media to describe the MiG plane made me stop and think. My journalistic colleagues harped so much on the plane's competitiveness, which meant that the idea of a sale was in the air.

Only recently, addressing the U.N. General Assembly's 43rd session, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stressed the Soviet government's concern at the menacing proliferation of conventional weaponry. Moscow believes it vital that urgent measures be taken to limit and end arms sales, especially to crisis-hit areas. Although, of course, arms sales on their own are no source of conflict, it is weaponry that makes such events highly probable.

Further, arms sales can also be seen as a form of confrontation inasmuch as the export of weapons from the countries of one of the opposed blocs is inevitably perceived by the countries of the other bloc as the destabilizing geopolitical factor. Neither continued nor expanded arms sales will serve to strengthen international confidence or enhance international security.

The expanding market for armaments in the Third World countries indirectly serves to step up arms production in the industrialized countries. Indeed, it is plain that the manufacture of any commodity, including weaponry, is especially profitable when this is done in large quantities. Consequently, the stable, even growing, demand for weaponry in the Third World likewise recruits more personnel and specialists to arms production in the industrialized states, which in turn is by no means conducive to better East-West relations. Surely the fact that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are the world's leading arms exporters is paradoxical, to say the least.

Yet for all that, arms sales unfortunately continue. There is a market for weapons and weapons are bought and sold. Admiral Gene La Rocque, chief of the U.S. Centre for Defence Information, has called weaponry the new international currency. According to some statistics, in 1986 as much as $31 billion worth of arms were imported by Third World countries alone, more than half the sum they received as economic aid. So far only a few of developing countries and just three industrialized capitalist states (Italy, Sweden and New Zealand) in the capitalist world, back arms sale restriction firmly enough.

True, laws limiting arms exports do operate in several countries. In some, for instance, Japan, arms exports are banned in general. However, these restrictions and bans are not always effective and are often violated, though sooner or later such violations come to light and the ensuing rows are published in the media. (Incidentally, how are arms exports controlled in this country? We know as little about that as about the decisions on arms sales. Who gets them? How much? And where do they go? On the other hand, we are fairly well informed about U.S. Congressional debates on, for instance, whether or not to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia.)

Be that as it may, national restrictions and controls on arms exports are on their own clearly inadequate. It is also absurd to urge the unilateral termination of sales, as competition in the arms market is stiff, and a seller will always be found. Nor would bilateral agreements be enough. The trouble is that arms proliferate not just because of direct deliveries from industrialized counties to Third World countries. The re-export of arms is also carried on. Traffic is also done in patents, licences, and weapon-making technologies. More exporters appear.

Hence an international machinery is essential to control arms sales. This should begin with negotiation and be followed up by the establishment of definite rules in the form of a multilateral convention with the relevant supervisory agencies. This should probably be done under the U.N. aegis, and most expeditiously at that.

An international machinery of this nature could make the available national means of controlling arms deliveries and sales more effective. Apart from that more openness, more glasnost in this field, more specifically in the Soviet Union, could quite feasibly serve to expedite the initiation of multilateral talks with regard to the entire range of problems associated with the limitation of arms sales.

I personally think that in order to promote constitutional forms and procedures for the adoption of crucial foreign policy decisions, a point which the Soviet Foreign Minister made when addressing the U.N. General Assembly's 43rd session, it would be essential to have this area as well (i.e., arms exports) subordinated to democratic public control and supervision.

As for the competitiveness of the amazing MiG, I would really be amazed were I to learn of the extraordinary competitiveness of Soviet-made domestic refrigerators, personal computers, and indeed, even clothes. But certainly not fighter planes.

Living on credit

Alexei Kireyev,
Cand. Sc. (Techn.)

Who is going to help the Third World deal with its debts and other economic problems? Is it going to be the East or the West, or had they perhaps better help themselves?

The main problem facing the developing nations is their external debt. It is impossible to assess it precisely, but according to some estimates, it topped the trillion dollar mark a long time ago.

The fluctuations of prices on the world oil market are a result of trends and disparities in the world energy situation, something the developing countries have skillfully exploited to bring economic and political pressure to bear on the West.

Following the painful, but fairly rapid adaptation of the world capitalist economy to the high prices of oil, the developing nations lost their one and only economic trump card. The West is virtually independent of exports from the developing nations. In his report entitled "Study of the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures," the U.N. Secretary-General pointed out that the developing countries at present retain a measure of control only over bauxites, cobalt, lithium, niobium, tantalum and tin. But the developing nations are unable to arrive at a concerted policy with regard to the marketing of these strategic materials. The raw materials market today is a buyer's market.

The oil glut of the mid-1980s once again showed the developing nations "who's who" in international economic relations, and made it absolutely clear that the energy crisis of the previous decade had revealed the shortcomings of the state monopolistic regulation mechanism. The West was taught a serious lesson and will no doubt try and avoid anything of the kind happening again.

Enormous though this sum is for the Third World, it is not staggering by the standards of the world capitalist economy. In the space of a single day during the Wall Street crash a trillion dollars was lost, albeit on paper. The 200 leading multinational corporations have an annual turnover of 3 trillion dollars. One trillion dollars is spent on weapons around the world every year. Ultimately, every nation is a debtor, and the U.S. is the biggest debtor of all. Many in the U.S. do not believe the allocation of trillions of dollars for SDI to be in any way extraordinary.

The size of the debt in absolute terms is less important than the rate at which the debt grows. On average, the debts of the developing nations grow at an annual rate of 9.5 per cent. That figure is far greater than the rate of the average annual growth of their GNP and exports. Moreover, the exports of the developing nations have showed a steady downward trend over this decade as a result of the decline in the prices of oil and other raw materials. The main source of payment is running dry rather than swelling.

The debts continue to grow largely through the accumulation of unpaid interest, not through the granting of fresh credits. The trend towards alienating the debts of the developing nations from the sphere of production is extremely dangerous, as the developing nations have to borrow to service their debts, rather than to invest. The debt blocks the migration of capital as short-term loans are spent to meet the obligations under debts run up a long time ago.

Another characteristic phenomenon is the drain of capital from the Third World to the industrialized Western nations. This is a result of the reduction of the size of practically every kind of aid to the developing nations while the amount of money they have to fork out to service their debts continues to grow. The biggest debtors, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela, have paid out 120 billion dollars to service their debts over the past four years, while they have received under 30 billion dollars in fresh loans over the same period.

At the beginning of the decade, the influx of capital from North to South came to an annual 40 billion dollars, compared with less than 30 billion in the mid-1980s. The French magazine Le Monde diplomatique says that the analysis of the situation reveals the terrible fact that the Third World, where half a billion people go hungry, is subsidizing the economies of prosperous nations.

Interdependence

It is quite impossible to isolate oneself from the problems of the majority of the human race in the world today. The West encountered problems when, as a result of the debt crisis, Mexico was denied credits in 1982 which led to the loss of at least a quarter of a million jobs in the U.S., more than during the crisis of the U.S. automobile industry.

The West got very jittery when there appeared a real possibility that several more developing nations that purchased its food products could go bankrupt. The so-called Baker Plan was hastily adopted in October 1985 to allocate 29 billion dollars to the 15 biggest debtors. Ostensibly, the money was allocated for economic reform, but in fact the credits were to induce the developing nations to continue to buy essential consumer goods from the West. The widely advertised Baker Plan was never fully implemented.

The International Monetary Fund established strict control over more than 30 developing nations that resolved to have their debt payments rescheduled. The nations concerned had to accept the "recommendations" of the IMF, as that was the only way to draw upon the IMF's resources. The recommendations of the IMF boiled down to encouraging exports to earn hard currency and service debts and giving the multinationals access to natural resources.

The Algerian newspaper El-Moudjahid called attention to the fact that the developing countries are asked to increase their exports, while at the same time barriers are created in the way of their goods; they are required to diversify their exports while at the same time only their raw materials and initially processed products are bought; they are required to increase their export earnings while every effort is made to keep the prices of their export goods low; they are advised to cut their imports, while at the same time Western goods are imposed on them.

Trade protectionism pursued by the industrialized capitalist countries leads to the deindustrialization of the overwhelm

ing majority of the developing nations with the exception of the few turned into "sweatshops" by the multinationals, which take advantage of cheap labour prepared to do anything at all.

The shake-up did multinational capital a power of good, because it induced it to respond to fluctuations in the international financial situation more flexibly. For their part, the banks rapidly became aware of the need to insure themselves against the possibility of pressure from the debtors. Sixty U.S. banks set up a reserve of 18 billion dollars in case they had to pay the debts of the developing nations.

Debt conversion, that is the exchange of obligations under debts for shares in companies owned by the developing nations, has been chosen as the optimal way of sustaining the finances of the developing nations. According to Le Monde diplomatique, the idea of debt conversion is not to assure an influx of capital into the country concerned, but rather to take possession of its industry. That is essentially a colonialist policy pursued, ostensibly, to reduce the size of the debts, the journal concludes.

Disarmament for development

The developing nations believe that only a new economic order can help them deal with the situation they are facing. The weak point of that idea is that the developing nations have no clear-cut programme for reforming their economies. At the same time they put too much emphasis on obtaining economic aid in the expectation that they will be able to attain economic self-reliance.

The 1980s have demonstrated that this objective cannot be achieved in this way. The West is not willing to help the developing nations to secure economic sovereignty and the East is unable to help them because of lack of resources. True to its internationalist duty, the U.S.S.R. will continue to do its best to help developing nations economically. It must not be forgotten, however, that it is a drain on its resources that are badly needed under the conditions of restructuring.

In the circumstances, the mechanism of the world economy is unable to resolve the North-South problem automatically. In my view the developing nations themselves possess the biggest potential for assuring economic security. There is growing appreciation of the fact that the debt problem cannot be dealt with through a total default or the paying up of all debts. Either proposition is unrealistic. The debt will remain a reality of the world economic situation for the foreseeable future, and the Western creditors will continue to provide the debtors with credits to avoid the problem of their defaulting on their debts.

Dealing with the problem of debts goes beyond the confines of economics and extends to politics. An end to the wasteful expenditure of resources on weapons would make it possible to increase the rate of economic growth in practically every part of the world.

Regrettably, disarmament is seen by quite a few developing nations as a privilege that only the superpowers can afford. In that context they insist on the primacy of nuclear disarmament.

Conventional disarmament is seen by the developing nations as a more remote prospect. Regional conflicts that have existed for a long time aggravate the problem and fresh conflicts break out. There are many acrimonious border disputes between developing nations, and many of them have been carried over from the colonialist divison of the world. The leaders of some developing nations would much rather buy sophisticated fighter bombers and tanks than invest in development.

The least developed nations with per capita incomes of below 440 dollars spend an average 5.5 per cent of their GNP on weapons, one per cent on health care and less than 3 per cent on education.

The squandering of resources in the developing countries is taking place in a situation where the production growth is lagging behind population growth. In order to stabilize the amount of production in per capita terms, the Black African countries must increase the proportion of their GNP spent on accumulation by 3 per cent, exactly the amount of money spent by the African nations situated south of the Sahara on weapons.

The developing nations must themselves draw up a collective and realistic programme for economic independence, relying above all on disarmament. Only the developing world itself can cope with the heavy burden of economic decolonization. There is no other way.

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

Tatic

Reprinted from the Süddeutsche Zeitung (F.R.G.)

A presidential republic without a President

For the first time since 1943, Lebanon has found itself without a president. Two governments, whose approaches to the settlement of the protracted internal conflict are poles apart, are functioning simultaneously in the country. Can dual power perpetuate the division of the country?

They say in Lebanon that each newly elected president spends his constitutional six-year term of office as follows: two years learning the ropes; the next two years ruling the country, and the rest of the term struggling to secure the post for whoever he regards as the most suitable successor. The civil war now in progress for over 13 years has made substantial changes in this traditional idea. Today it would be safe to presume that the Lebanese President tries to rule throughout the six-year term of his constitutional powers while in effect merely "reigning," as the deep internal conflict rending Lebanese society has detracted dramatically from his power; in fact, there is little he can do to neutralize the armed militias of the warring camps.

Nevertheless, the presidential palace in Baabda remains for the Lebanese a symbol, if not the bulwark, of statehood, which survives as if by magic amid the centrifugal tornadoes of the civil war. This is why the elections of the head of state, which were to have been held late last summer upon the expiry of Amin Gemayel's term of office, have become the biggest talking point on the Lebanese political scene this year.

The maze of contradictions

The sinister symptoms of the inevitable constitutional crisis have accumulated gradually, adding up to a picture which has given even inveterate optimists no grounds for illusions. With every passing day, forecasts for the autumn have become increasingly restrained and cautious, while some politicians noted for their realistic and sober way of thinking guessed in advance with amazing shrewdness what course events would take.

"We are afraid the elections will be thwarted," Walid Joumblatt, chairman of the Progressive Socialist Party, told a press conference in Kuwait. "The result will be of what is known as a constitutional vacuum, which will enable President Gemayel to form an interim government.

Walid Joumblatt had every reason for making such a prediction. Under the Lebanese Constitution, only a Maronite Christian can be elected to the post of president, which means that any candidate is supposed to have the support of at least the majority of the groupings constituting the right-wing Christian political establishment. This appears problematic: the power struggle which has broken out within the right-wing Christian camp has made it highly unlikely that the rivalling political forces will succeed in the end in reaching a compromise and put forward a candidate acceptable to all.

The situation has been further complicated by that fact that even such a compromise would be just the first, and by no means the most difficult stage on a Maronite candidate's way to presidency. After all, he can hope for success only if his candidature is accepted on the other side of the "green line" – specifically, by Shiite and Sunnite Muslims, and by the organizations and parties forming the Lebanese national patriotic froces.

Even this would not suffice, however. A specific feature of the political situation in Lebanon is that almost all the major organizations, parties and groupings maintain strong links with some forces or other outside the country which, by an ineluctable logic, form a "second echelon" in the line-up in the civil conflict, and seek to influence developments in Lebanon by any means. The Lebanese I know have told me that no candidate can succeed unless his orientation and political programme prove acceptable to Syria or the U.S. Since the spring of 1988, the Lebanese press has been closely following American-Syrian talks and consultations. It is only a candidate advocating an American-Syrian compromise who will stand a



The "green line" dividing Beirut in two today is a symbol of dual power. Will the situation ever return to normal?

real chance of success, many believe here.

At the same time, failure to take into account other important circumstances would make the assessment of the political situation, which set in in the country in the summer of 1988, not only incomplete, but even largely distorted. Whereas right-wing Christian politicians regard the election of another maronite president as proof that the confessionalist political system, which guarantees the privileges of the powerful Maronite bourgeoisie, is unshakable, the national patriotic forces opposed to this system and insisting on far-reaching democratic reforms look upon the filling of the presidential vacancy as the essential precondition for renewed national dialogue and the prevention of the division of the country.

And one further point. As the parliamentary session which was to elect the new president drew near, Lebanese political circles were asking increasingly often if parliament, in its present composition, was adequately expressing the views of the majority of Lebanese. Indeed, elected long before the civil war, in the spring of 1972, the Lebanese parliament has not since been reelected, although 23 of the original 99 of the Chamber of Deputies members have since died. Considering that some of the survivers have long left Lebanon and given up politics, these doubts as to parliament's competence are well-founded.

When the worst comes to the worst

Be that as it may, Hussein al-Husseini, speaker of the Lebanese parliament, officially declared the election session open on July 23, 1988. Under the Constitution, a new president was to have been elected before August 23 or, if complications arose, in the first half of September, not later than ten days before the expiry of President Gemayel's term of office on September 23.

In the Lebanese election campaign, the emphasis is not on the voting procedure as such (which, given a quorum, is a mere formality in most cases anyway), but on the preelection period, in the course of which politicians of various orientations hold intensive discussions aimed at bringing out the most acceptable candidature, and make trips to agree upon the candidature with interested circles abroad. Consequently, the Lebanese president is not actually a "consensus president" but a "compromise one," and has therefore to reckon with all those who have given him a hand in his upward climb.

In July-August 1988, no such compromise was achieved. It was only on August 16, two days before the officially scheduled polling day, after the preelection debates seemed to have reached an impasse, that Suleiman Frangié, Lebanon's President from 1970 to 1976, suddenly announced his intention to run for the post.

As distinct from many other aspirants, Frangié outlined a preelection programme which provided for the rotation of the president's, prime minister's and parliamentary speaker's posts between representatives of the Maronite, Sunnite and Shiite communities, reducing the president's term of office from six to four years, and increasing the Shiite community's representation in the National Assembly. Suleiman Frangié told an August 16 press conference that he would, if elected president, make every effort to achieve a settlement in Lebanon and carry out sweeping political reforms there.

Frangié's decision to run for the presidency, backed by Syria and the Lebanese national patriotic forces, caused a considerable stir in the right-wing Christian camp. As was to be expected, the candidature of the 78-year-old Maronite leader from Zghorta was bitterly opposed by the Lebanese Front, the Lebanese Forces and other right-wing Christian organizations, which were not happy about his programme and still less so about his views (he advocates an Arab character for Lebanon and favours special relations with Damascus).

"The election of Frangié will lead to the dismembering of the country," said Samir Djaadaa, leader of the Lebanese Forces. "The parliamentary session will not take place due to the absence of a quorum, and this will go on until Frangié withdraws his candidature."

That these were not meaningless threats became clear as early as on the morning of August 18. Of the 76 members of parliament, only 39 turned up at the extraordinary session, three were late, and one walked out within minutes of arrival. Attempts to contact the absent deputies by phone proved vain as someone had taken the precaution of disconnecting the parliament building on Place de l'Etoile from the city telephone exchange. By a "chance coincidence," all telephone lines between Western and Eastern Beirut went dead on August 18. It later transpired that two MPs were being held by force by Lebanese Forces patrols, and 15 Christian MPs had been turned back half-way by their coreligionists under threat of violence.

The thwarting of the emergency parliamentary session was graphic evidence of the right-wing Christian forces' unwillingness to make any compromises and led to renewed aggravation of the situation in the country. As part of the effort to break the deadlock, the mechanism for various contacts, sessions and talks was set in motion again, and Richard Murphy resumed his mediatory trips. It was now obvious to all, however, that for all the good will shown by Damascus and the leadership of the Lebanese national patriotic forces, the elections of a new president were doomed to failure. This was borne out by rumours circulating in Beirut to the effect that President Gemayel was going to form, before the expiry of his term of office, a so-called "interim government," which actually meant the transfer of power to the right-wing Maronite top-ranking military.

And true enough, before he stepped down, Amin Gemayel announced the formation of an interim government headed by Michel Aun, Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese army.

Dual power

Following the retirement of Amin Gemayel, the presidential palace in Baabda was left unoccupied for the first time since the proclamation of Lebanon's independence. On September 23, 1988, the presidential republic was for the first time without a president but had two cabinets.

The dual power that emerged from President Gemayel's "farewell gesture" – made, some sources say, not without pressure from the Lebanese Forces and their leader Samir Djaadaa – has intensified the rapid polarization of political forces, pushing the country to the brink of a split. The leaders of Lebanon's Muslim communities, as well as the heads of the parties and organizations comprising the coalition of the national patriotic forces, have voiced their unanimous support for the Selim Hoss government, which includes such key political figures as Walid Joumblatt, chairman of the Progressive Socialist Party, and Nabih Berry, the leader of Shiite Amal movement. For their part, the right-wing Christian parties have unconditionally recognized the military cabinet, turning a blind eye to the fact that three of its six members have declined to take part in its work immediately.

In the meantime, Muslim and left-wing

circles, and even John McCarthy, newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, have their doubts as to the legality of the formation of a military cabinet headed by a Maronite general – without the civilian government having been officially disbanded, into the bargain. Ambassador McCarthy is not even in any haste to present his credentials, waiting for the situation to be clarified. Other heads of foreign embassies and missions have also shown restraint: Michel Aun's invitation to members of the diplomatic corps to visit him in the Baabda Palace has been answered by only a few diplomats. As for the Arab countries, all of them, with the exception of Iraq, have refrained from any official diplomatic contacts with the military cabinet.

The parallel existence of two governments that do not recognize each other in Eastern and Western Beirut cannot but serve to aggravate the situation in the city. Already on the evening of September 23, automatic and mortar fire was exchanged across the "green line" dividing the city into the Christian and Muslim sectors.

Despite dual power, however, most Lebanese are not inclined to believe that the country's division into two ministates has become an accomplished fact. On October 2, a conference attended by the leaders of the national patriotic forces and prominent political figures representing various religious communities of Lebanon was held in Walid Joumblatt's residence in Mukhtara. Having condemned the formation of the interim government as an attempt at a military coup, the conference's participants declared their support for a concerted effort to preserve the unity of Lebanon, and called on the whole nation to support the Hoss cabinet as the sole lawful government of the country.

Many in Lebanon today believe that an early end to dual power could prepare the way for the election of a new president. Press and political opinion has been shifting markedly of late in favour of Raymond Eddé, chairman of National Bloc Party, as the most suitable candidate for a "consensus president." Time will tell whether the 75-year-old liberal Maronite politician, permanently resident in Paris, will gain the support of various political forces inside and outside Lebanon.

Igor Timofeyev

Photo from Spiegel (F.R.G.)

Voice of America from Moscow

André de Nesnera has become the Voice of America's first correspondent in Moscow

"You were head of the VOA bureau in Geneva and came to the Soviet Union to cover important events, as for example, the Tbilisi meeting of members of the Soviet and American public in September. What was the reaction when people learned you were a VOA correspondent?"

"It depended. Some were really astonished to see my press card. Some approached me to ask if I was with the VOA, and after I answered in the affirmative, inquired if I felt hostile to the Russians. My answer was 'of course not.' I'm a professional journalist, I've come here to report on the developments in your country and I am not biassed in any way. However, existing stereotypes about the VOA lead some people to believe they know in advance what I am going to report and how."

"What is your idea of a journalist's responsibility?"

"I think responsibility is fundamental to journalism. Irresponsible journalists do their readers or listeners a disservice. My idea of professional responsibility stems from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of presenting news. I never try to foist my point of view on the reader, nor do I guide him to the one and only conclusion. Every event ought to be described in all its diversity."

"We've lived through times when the Soviet-American relations were extremely tense. It seems to me that in those periods Soviet and American journalists alike never departed from the official line. How was that possible if every periodical claimed to have its own stand and its own readers?"

"The main thing here was the stereotypes we'd created about each other. A lot of American journalists who were covering Soviet life in the 1950s and the 1960s, when you were a closed society, had the impression that in the Soviet Union one could not speak freely to people, that it was next to impossible to collect information here. Their work was much harder then. The same applies to Soviet journalists working in the U.S. These stereotypes could have been removed if we had had free access to information and high-ranking officials. The openness campaign has made this possible. Some five years ago I discarded Soviet publications without bothering to read them. I knew everything you could write in it anyway. Today there is so much interesting information in your newspapers that I just don't have the time to read everything. Today you don't seem to have any taboo issues. This deserves to be profoundly analyzed, and we must understand the processes that are under way in your country correctly."

"Tell me, André, where does your interest in the Soviet Union come from, and where did you learn Russian?"

"I have Russian grandparents. They left Russia for Paris in 1917 with the first wave of émigrés. My grandmother taught me to love Russian culture and the Russian spiritual heritage. I lived in New York and studied journalism and foreign politics there, majoring in Soviet-American relations, always hoping I would some day be a correspondent in Moscow."

"When are you going to start your work here?"

"Hard to say, I guess as soon as they find bureau premises and an apartment for me. Housing in Moscow is in great demand, I know. They tell me it'll take two or three months, but as an accredited correspondent I'm free to fly to Moscow at any time."

Interviewer
Sergei Goryachev

New promise

taly-2000 show n Moscow encouraging or cooperation

What attracted me to the Europa Metall rm display exhibiting various items of opper and its alloys was an unusual map f Europe, the Western half of which is ppered with the firm's branches and gencies and the Eastern half of which is now-white.

"True enough, we still have no busiess contacts with the U.S.S.R.," the m's commercial manager, Signor aolo Caretti, explained. "We have great opes of this show. We have analyzed e Soviet market and are exhibiting here nly specimens that we are certain will inerest your businessmen. Representaves from several enterprises have aleady seen our display, though to be ank, we do not quite understand what uthority they have."

Signor Caretti drew a neat chart with umerous explanation squares denoting nterprises linked by arrows, and a larger atched square in the centre, to which e arrows point. I soon realized that the agic square in the middle designated e Soviet foreign trade organization, hose staff, who have a very hazy idea of hat Soviet factories actually needed, as in Signor Caretti's view a hampering termediary link. What a familiar picture!

"Yesterday I heard Academician Abel ganbegian give a convincing account at conference of the process of peresoika in the Soviet economy's internaonal ties," Signor Caretti continued. But as far as I can see, the changes are low in coming, as practice lags behind e theoretical aspect."

Dr Paolo Straneo, Managing Director f the Pressindustria Stock Company, inervened to comment: "I can understand e headaches of firms venturing into the oviet market for the first time. We tarted contacts with the U.S.S.R. more han 15 years ago and for us many of the roblems that beset Italian businessmen re a thing of the past."

Comparing Pressindustria's achieveents with Europa Metall's initial venure, I noted that Dr Straneo's name card as, unlike those of his Italian colleagues, bilingual, in Russian as well. A trifle, one would think, but a significant one.

Many Italian firms (about a thousand have contacts with the U.S.S.R.) exhibiting in Moscow have traditional ties with us. Indeed, the fluent Russian of Signor Alberto Carughi, the Commercial Manager of Fata for the Soviet Union, indicates frequent spells in this country.

"For more than ten years," he observed. "Fata has been helping to equip a number of enterprises in differnt fields with sophisticated equipment."

The fashionable footwear show which attracted quite a crowd turned out to have been made not in Italy, but in Togliatti (the U.S.S.R.) at one of the three Soviet factories built on "turn-key" basis by the Concerie Cogolo firm, each of which will be producing an annual two million pairs of shoes when they reach design capacity.



A section of the Italy-2000 show

Photo by S. Podlesnov

As Signor Giovanni Cogolo, one of the firm's managers, noted, "our firm is pinning great hopes on the Italy-2000 show as regards the promotion of cooperation. At the opening ceremony our display attracted Mikhail Gorbachev's eye and we are currently negotiating joint ventures."

I heard much said at the show about the possibility of joint ventures. What appeal do such arrangements hold out to Italian businessmen? "Because they are advantageous for both sides," Signor Cogolo explained. However, he did not bother to explain what exactly will ensure profit. I was left to draw the conclusion for myself, that it would more often than not derive from the cheap raw material and labour.

It is no easy matter to get down to brass tacks as regards economic contacts. The Italians smilingly reply with evasive answers, though, frankly speaking, I had expected the already familiar criticism as regards the slowness if not incompetence of Soviet business partners. But all I heard were a few wishes from the Europa Metall representative, plus the remarks of FIAT President Giovanni Agnelli about the difficulties of financing joint ventures, the limitations imposed on the transfer of sophisticated technology to the socialist countries, and competition.

One can easily understand the diplomatic niceties of the other businessmen. They are hoping for new contracts. When I asked Signor Gianni Bravo about the problems of cooperation, he also brushed them aside, saying that ties were the same as with other countries. I did not insist. I would only like to explain that Signor Bravo is chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Handicrafts and Farming of the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region. Its firms, which export products to a hundred odd countries, are offering us projects for joint ventures in the fields of electronics, engineering, laser technology and the light industries, because as Signor Bravo says, they lead the world in this respect.

Indeed, contacts based on good traditions and sophisticated technology are the most promising of all.

Yuri Vorobyovsky

The land needs its master

LEV VOSKRESENSKY

The meeting at the CPSU Central Committee building on Staraya Ploshchad in central Moscow on October 12, at which lease and contract farming and economic relationships in the countryside were discussed, illuminated how Soviet agrarian policy has been **shaping up.** It was developing from experimentation and a new approach to the food problem to an integrated system of ideas and actions, and a long-term **policy.**

It is impossible to develop farming without employing advanced technologies and achievements in the field of crossbreeding, machinery, the use of chemicals, and land improvement. Equally essential is the modernization of storage, transportation, processing and sales, whose imperfections, mildly speaking, cause at least a quarter of our farm produce to rot.

Finally, it is also clear that better working and living conditions for the farmer are an inalienable component of Soviet agrarian policy.

Yet I would describe the new production relations in the countryside as comprising the backbone of this policy. What must be done is to give the land back to the farmer and make him the fully-fledged master of the land. As for his relations with the consumer and, particularly, the state, these must be based on economic factors incorporating taxes, prices, credits, interest and repayment terms, in short, on the principles of the **socialist market.**

Now this policy is not a bolt from the blue. It is nothing new. It has strong roots that go back to the early 1920s. I would even risk to call it an advanced NEP, New Economic Policy, one which though of the same social direction, is enriched by the experience amassed over the decades that have since elapsed and relies on the stupendous potential built up in the countryside, as well as on the achievements of the present-day scientific and technological revolution. Indeed, one can say what we need today is the New Economic Policy plus the scientific and technological revolution.

Contract farming appears to be one of the most efficient forms of the new production relations to have appeared in the countryside. A mere couple of years ago this was considered illegal. However, its successes are now so much in evidence that it would be a waste of time to sing its advantages or, still more so, to defend it. What one does fear, though, is that it might become a vogue, in the worst meaning of the word; that in the drive to involve the entire peasantry in contract farming, we could discredit the whole venture, as was the case time and again in the past – in which connection we might recall the melancholy maize story. One fears that the sum and substance of contract farming, which rests on cost accounting, could be emasculated.

And the master needs the land

Nor should we rush to adopt the appropriate law, because, however good it might be in itself, it cannot reverse the established realities of today. That fine law on socialist enterprise has still to justify the hopes reposed in it. Nor have we sensed any of those changes that could have occurred following the enactment of the law on cooperatives or the introduction of the new collective farm charter. Hence, one thinks, it is not a question of this or that law.

Addressing the Central Committee meeting mentioned at the beginning, V. Gusenkov, a contract farmer from outside Moscow, observed: "What we see in practice today is the duality of power. The managers don't want to relinquish power, while the rank-and-file don't know how to take over this power or how to use it. Contract farmers are dead set against the bureaucratic command system, which continues to operate."

As I see it, we are not even in a position, unfortunately, to speak of a duality of power, as so far the command system is still monopolizing economic authority. What is vital at this point is not simply to dismantle the command system, but to replace it with a machinery for socialist market regulation. However, I think we should start off not by enacting a contract farming law, but by tackling such routine issues as the regulations as regards the price of the contracted land, the organization of wholesale trade in the means of production, the overhauling of wholesale purchase, procurement and retail prices and the introduction of a procedure for incentive providing taxation and crediting. Without all that, the work collectives, the producer cooperatives and the contract farmers will not become genuine, responsible masters of their land, who subsist on what they earn and stand in no need whatever of either subsidies or commands from above.

I have still one more argument against any hasty enactment of a contract farming law. We must first take careful stock of what experience itself suggests. At the Central Committee meeting, Estonian farmer M. Saldre revealed that the emergence of independent family-operated businesses was already a fact that could not be ignored. The infrastructure of the agrarian industrial complex is becoming increasingly complex, with practice overturning dogmatic approach and stereotypes. Whether large industrial complexes, specialized state farms, collective farms that are actually cooperatives of cooperatives, independent farmer-type family businesses and even individual household allotments can all exist within the context of the socialist economic system, and indeed complement one another. However, what must be done is to see that they are all equal in practice, that they all have the opportunity to get the most out of the land they farm. The socialist economic family must have neither princesses nor cinderellas.

The time for half-hearted measures has gone. The countryside expects the forthcoming February CPSU Central Committee plenum to take radical decisions and draft a new agrarian policy which will make the peasant really and truly the fully-fledged master of his land.

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

The Popular Front

What and Whither?

What is happening in the Baltic republics? How much truth is there in the rumours that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia want to "fence themselves off" from the rest of the Soviet Union? What place does the Popular Front occupy in the political life of these republics?

It is impossible to assess the scale of events from Moscow. Television and the press have to work very hard on a daily basis to present an adequate picture of events and changes. It is not enough to write about the heated debates that take place every day from morning till night at the foot of the Liberty Monument in Riga, or the collection of signatures to all sorts of appeals in Tallinn's Old Quarter. It is not enough to look at the programmes of the republican popular fronts (inaugural congresses were held in Tallinn and Riga in early October. A congress in Lithuania is to be held at the end of this month). It is not enough to read an official report in a Party newspaper about the republic's government being grilled by the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika (an analogue to the Popular Front) on economic issues. One has to see the unprecedented increase in popular activity in which people talk not about prices, the rationing of sugar, and rumours that there are plans to introduce meat rationing in some places, but about the political struggles that have swept the Baltic republics and seem to provide the main content of life in the region.

Credibility gap?

The socio-economic situation in the Baltic republics can hardly be described as grave, certainly not compared with other regions of the country. It is not perceived to be grave (a lot of people have always wanted to go to the Baltic to work or at least on holiday, to eat well and do some shopping) and statistics are comforting. However, people were not judging the situation by the average All-Union yardstick. To begin with, people in the Baltic have known better times. Secondly, because the independence that the republics enjoyed in the two decades between the wars, the circumstances under which they joined the U.S.S.R. in 1940 were not perceived here in quite the same way as school history textbooks sought to portray. Thirdly, it is now clear that the integration of these republics into the national economy of the Soviet Union was not always sensibly pursued and was seen by many as an attempt to deprive the republics of independence, and even as Russification.

Previously, discontent with the methods of the central government could not fail to impress itself on those who visited the Baltic. It was evident in every-day life. Even the reticent Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians could not conceal their hostility to visitors from other parts of the country. In those years it could be explained away as resentment at the mass invasion by holiday-makers during the summer season. But in fact the roots went far deeper....

The most surprising thing is the total absence in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn of the powerful academic teams of historians, ethnographers, social psychologists and economists who should have addressed the novel situation in our society as early as last summer. We are not equipped to understand and perceive this situation correctly. It defies traditional categorization. To assess what is happening in the Baltic one needs to study the situation at the highest scientific level. Otherwise, developments may take a dangerous turn with implications for the whole country. In the Baltic, to all the problems confronting our society the national question is added.

One way to describe the situation in the republics is to say that the authorities suffer from a credibility gap. This formula was heard at the plenary meeting of the

CC of the Estonian Communist Party. Ultimatum-like demands were heard that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic should resign, and the republican press treats top leaders in an unwonted way. Even more important is the fact that people are looking not to official structures, from which they don't seem to expect anything, but to the new political movement, the Popular Front (or the Movement for Perestroika).

The Popular Front in all three republics was born as a result of widespread discontent with the way the republics were being run and with the level of social and economic development. This discontent was fuelled by the desire to enjoy true sovereignty and independence as something tangible. Perestroika and democratization offered such an opportunity.

All over the Baltic, in putting forward initiatives the Popular Front is one jump ahead of the Party, Soviet and YCL bodies, which often end up by expressing support for the Front's initiatives and readiness to work for their realization. This support has made it possible to implement many of the Popular Front's ideas. National symbols are being revived, and national languages are being proclaimed official. The ecological demands of the Popular Front have been accepted. A strategy for a republic-wide cost-accounting system is being developed. The Popular Front is becoming the ruler of people's minds. It is recruiting adherents and even establishing international ties. Delegations of the Estonian Popular Front have had talks with the Hungarian Patriotic People's Front, the National Front of Czechoslovakia and the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth in Poland.

The emergence of the Popular Front in Estonia and Latvia as well as of the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika, was met with a guarded reaction. Much of what the initiators of these movements said would have been described as out-and-out "dissidence" in former times. Following the spring of 1985, organizations with similar programmes mushroomed in other parts of the country and in the centre. They staged rallies, tried to publicize their programmes and held congresses. But none of them has been able to build up a potential constituency big enough to make them a force to be reckoned with. Not so in the three Baltic movements. They are moving from strength to strength. The intelligentsia provided the nucleus. It is no fortuity that the most critical assessments of the situation in the republics and the most radical measures to remedy it were put forward at the plenary meetings of the unions of creative workers in Latvia and Estonia. But support for the Popular Front is not coming from writers and scientists alone: it has the backing of practically all social strata among the indigenous population. There are supporters among Party workers as well. The movement was soon able to make its voice heard through the mass media (I understand that it will soon have its own press). Why did this happen? Because the Popular Front's programme offers an idea which the whole people support.

Let it be said clearly that the Popular Front as a movement in support of perestroika has won over hundreds of thousands of people who are longing for change. They see the Popular Front not only as a powerful catalyst of the processes of perestroika but as a convenient form of grassroots participation in these processes. That is why the republican party organizations have supported this broad popular movement while at the same time warning against any extremism or nationalism. One can have nothing but praise for the activity of the Popular Front aimed at awakening the masses, and for everything it does in the interests of the people. But our approval does not rule out, but, on the contrary, presupposes a thoughtful assessment of the programmes and goals of the Popular Front, which is making headlines at home but has not been accorded a thorough critical analysis in the central press.

Structure

How is the Popular Front organized?

The Charter of the Popular Front of Estonia lays down the following structure.

All citizens of the republic, from the age of 16, can be members of the PF. Those who wish to take part in the movement unite in support groups or simply take part in PF events. Support groups are created in residential neighbourhoods, work collectives, non-government organizations, parishes, unions of creative workers and in schools. The support group elects its representative, who runs day-to-day affairs. At the next level there are the Popular Fronts of villages, towns and cities; their main task is to take active part in the election of power bodies at every level, the protection of civil rights, and the moulding of political consciousness. The leading body is the Council of Representatives. Day-to-day affairs are run by a Board elected by the Council.

The supreme body of the Popular Front of the republic is the congress, convoked once a year and elected by popular meetings or councils of representatives from amongst candidates nominated by the support groups.

What relations does it have with the republican authorities? The PF is not subordinate to Party bodies.

What are the platforms of the Popular Fronts and the Lithuanian Movement for Perestroika?

Political system

The main objective is to achieve the sovereignty of their republics. The Popular Front of Latvia proposes that the constitutions of the Soviet Union and the republic should separate the jurisdiction of the federation and the republic, giving the latter the right of veto on all questions that are important to the republic, as well as the right to enter into independent relationships with other states and international organizations. The Popular Front of Estonia wants a clear statement that the interests of the union republic come before those of the Union as a whole. Defence and diplomacy are entrusted to the Union, which does not preclude some form of recognition of the republic by any state or international organization.

The PFs are in favour of a law-governed state, the separation of legislative, executive and judiciary powers, and a Constitutional Court as an entirely independent body.

"Genuine self-government of the people must replace government that acts on behalf of, but is alienated from the people." A new electoral law is being proposed that would "guarantee free contest of different views and strict monitoring of the counting of election results." The movements are preparing for next year's election campaign in all the republics. They hope to be able to hold it in a new way and to secure the election of deputies who support their programmes.

The legislative bodies in the republics would play a far more important role than today. There are already proposals that they should set up commissions to monitor the activity of military organizations, bodies concerned with security and internal affairs, and the prosecutor's office on the territory of their republics.

Human rights

Unlike many other ideas of the Popular Fronts, their proposals on this issue have been universally welcomed in the republics. Human rights are to be brought into harmony with internationally recognized documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, So-

ial and Cultural Rights. This would include legal and practical guarantees of the inviolability of the individual and the home, secret correspondence and telephone conversations, the full implementation of glasnost in state and public life, the citizen's right to obtain full information about his country and people, access to any files on him kept by any institution and the right to challenge its authenticity through the law courts; the abolition of censorship; free contacts with citizens of other countries, with refusal to issue a foreign travel passport – with the exception of cases stipulated by law – subject to appeal in the courts.

Mass repressions, deportations and other crimes of Stalinism must be recognized as crimes against humanity and the names of the immediate culprits and active executors of the terror must be made public. In addition to this provision common to all the Popular Fronts in the Baltic, the Estonian Popular Front proposes to publish lists of the victims of repression, erect memorials to them, and compensate survivors for the moral and material damage.

It is proposed to review the cases of all those sentenced in the sixties, seventies and eighties for their political and religious activities, as no beliefs professed in a democratic society in peace-time can justify the use of criminal punishment. The Popular Front of Estonia believes it necessary to revise the criminal code to bring it into line with the principles of a democratic, law-governed state. These proposals have much in common with demands in other parts of the country; the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., we are told, is also to have the articles on punishment for "anti-Soviet" statements deleted from it.

Some proposals stem specifically from local experience.

Criminals sentenced by a law court should serve their sentences on the territory of the republic. The Popular Front of Latvia stipulates that prisoners from other republics cannot be brought to Latvia or allowed to remain in Latvia after serving their sentences. Similar proposals, incidentally, have been voiced in Siberia, whose people find it if anything, even more of a problem.

The proposals to introduce labour conscription for young people who are conscientious objectors to military service reflect the nationwide discussions concerning military service. There are demands to demilitarize schools, take military training off the curriculum and exempt college and university students from active military service. National servicemen should be allowed to serve in their native republics, with the native language to be used in the army along with Russian. The Latvian Popular Front believes it necessary to restore the right of a republic to have a military force recruited from amongst its citizens, as was legalized by the former Constitution.

The republic must pay its way

Central to the proposals of the Popular Front is the economic programme known as regional cost accounting. This demand is not confined to the Baltic. The Estonian Popular Front considers cost accounting to be a necessary condition and a constituent element of sovereignty, as it paves the way for true independence. How does the Popular Front interpret such independence?

Photo by K. Isakov and S. Podleskov

The republic would make all economic decisions itself, without any interference from the Centre. Trade and economic ties with other parts of the Soviet Union would be exercised only through the market. There would be full freedom of action on the world market. Regional cost accounting is a serious idea with which top economists in the Baltic are grappling. It is up to the professionals to assess the results of their deliberations, but the outlines of the discussions are already clear.

All enterprises, including those under all-union jurisdiction, would pass to republican control. The republic would have the right to sovereignty in the use of its natural resources.

The republic would independently shape its own budget, and plan its economic and social development (with the exception, perhaps, of the defence industries, which would be regarded as the state property of the U.S.S.R.) The sectoral ministries for management, distribution and control would be dissolved, with the possible exception of the ministry of the agro-industrial complex, and a single ministry for industry. Also necessary would be the ministries of finance, labour, social security and environment protection. Government ministries and departments would not have direct control over economic activity. Enterprises would operate independently, their work being controlled exclusively by a system of taxes and other economic levers.

Favourable conditions would be created for foreign investments especially investments by émigrés. Republican currency would be introduced and a free currency market opened. The possibility is being considered of turning the whole of Estonia into a free economic zone with corresponding customs and tax legislation.

More profound transformations would be needed in the economic system, such as the free development of cooperative, individual and private property. "Private ownership of the means of production cannot and must not be a temporary economic measure; it calls for constitutional guarantees. The Popular Front favours the transfer of state enterprises, on a contractual basis, to work collectives, cooperatives, public organizations and individuals," says the programme of the Estonian Popular Front. Land would be handed over to the peasants in per-

petuity, i.e., the small-holding system would be revived.

A host of questions arise, as the interests of the republic could turn out to be at odds with those of the Union. Is it possible to introduce full cost accounting in one or several republics, while methods in other regions remain as they were? What would relations be between those republics that have gone over to cost accounting and those that have not? How would the changes in the monetary system in the republics proposed by the PFs dovetail with the existing system (which is likely to be preserved in the rest of the U.S.S.R.)? The proposed restructuring of the productive forces in the republic would greatly depend on the traditional Baltic pattern of agriculture. Where would its produce be marketed? The European Community is hardly a prospective buyer, so food would be offered to the other republics, but they would pay in rubles, while the development of science-intensive industry, which is the goal proclaimed in the PF programmes, needs convertible currency. Where would it be obtained? Opening the floodgates to foreign capital does not always work; in the event of failure, who would pay up on the credits: the republic or the Union?

Questions of a more general character also arise. Does full economic autonomy for the republics mean that the Union-wide planning system is to be scrapped? If only the Baltic republics are excluded from the system, this means their effective separation from the life of the country. The desire for political autonomy and broad international ties proclaimed by the Popular Front could lead to separatism. Some states do operate on a federalist basis, with their component parts enjoying the broadest autonomy. Examples are not far to seek. The Ukraine and Byelorussia – as sovereign republics – are members of the U.N. The Baltic republics may well claim the right to be similarly represented in international organizations. It is significant that the programme documents of the Popular Front devote much space to plans to establish various international ties and very little space to relations within the Soviet Union. (That is why the economic programme of the Popular Front differs from the cost-accounting strategies being developed by the governments of the Baltic republics).

What implications would the introduction of republican citizenship have? Needless to say, in their speeches, articles and interviews the leaders of the Popular Front deny any separatist tendency or the desire to secede. The Popular Front's leaders state firmly that such ideas are only advanced by extremists. But events follow an inherent logic of their own. If the PF programmes are **fully** implemented, what would be the concrete result? Wouldn't it lead to the virtual rupture of all ties between the Baltic republics and the Union? There are, of course, other points clearly unrealistic and unacceptable, but masked by appropriate rhetoric.

Protection of the environment looms large in the activity of the Popular Front and the Movement for Perestroika. protests against the Sloka paper plant, which pollutes the Bay of Riga and the Lielupe River, against the building of an underground railway in Riga, against a nuclear power plant in Lithuania and the mining of phosphorites in Northeastern Estonia have the backing of everyone in the Baltic republics. The programme of the National Front, therefore, proposes that the construction, modernization and operation of any industry be forbidden if it is not equipped with purification plants. It is necessary to control industrial waste disposal and regularly inform the public on the state of the environment.

The draft programme of the Estonian National Front emphasizes the commitment to peace, to proclaiming the Baltic republics and the whole of the Baltic Sea part of a nuclear-free North, and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Estonian soil.

Humanitarian issues

Last but not least comes **the nationalities question,** which is at the top of the agenda of the Popular Front.

To my mind, it is the position of the National Fronts in Estonia and Latvia and the Movement for Perestroika in Lithuania on this issue that has attracted the largest number of followers, on the one hand, and antagonized that part of the non-indigenous population which is setting up its own organizations (as in Estonia) – the International Movement and the Council of Work Collectives.

"When the sovereignty of various national entities was crudely violated, when entire peoples were resettled from their historic territories and their national statehood was liquidated, when numerous campaigns were conducted against so-called cosmopolitanism, bourgeois nationalism and zionism, the autocratic and anti-Leninist nationalities policy led to serious distortions and conflicts in national relations, the suppression of small ethnic groups, the restricted use of the national language, a sharp drop in the ethno-demographic potential of some nationalities (Latvians, Estonians and others), the stunting of national culture." (Popular Front of Latvia).

This is a statement of the facts. What are the proposals?

In Latvia, to establish Latvian constitutionally as the official language and Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication. As knowledge of Latvian increases, and mutual and real bilingualism spreads, Latvian is to become the language of inter-ethnic communication for the citizens of the republic.

In Estonia, to write into the Constitution that the language of the indigenous nationality is the official national language of the republic, to establish citizenship of the Union Republic and guarantee national symbols.

The Popular Front of Estonia: "Representatives of other nationalities living in each Union Republic should understand and recognize the right of the indigenous nationality to self-determination, i.e., the right to preserve and develop on their ancestral land their historic cultural patterns and way of life, to ensure the preservation of the nation and the language, and decide the future and the social order in their land. The Estonian S.S.R. is a national republic. While coming out first and foremost as a champion of the interests of the Estonian nation, it will be able to protect the interests of all other ethnic groups living here."

All this sounds sensible enough. But why has the Popular Front programme on national issues met with such adverse reactions on the part of the "non-indigenous" population, mainly Russians? Why do people feel that the programme not only impinges on their civil rights, but humiliates their national dignity? Perhaps because the proposed scheme would make for discrimination on a national basis, and investigating people's ethnic origins is always suggestive of nationalism.

Some people in the republics see the Popular Front programmes as departures from the principles of socialism, and detect separatist tendencies in them. In reply, they have been accused of Stalinism. But there are a still greater number of people who accuse these movements of national narrow-mindedness. The absolute majority of the people who take part in these movements in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are indigenous Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians. Representatives of other nationalities, notably Russian, have not joined the Popular Front, and preferred to set up alternative associations. Mutual accusations of nationalism and chauvinism have ensued. There is a danger of the republics being split on the basis of nationality. Just how real that danger is could form the subject of a separate study.

Leonid Mlechin

Riga – Vilnius – Tallinn – Moscow

JUNIOR WORLD

Teach how to vote, learn how to vote

Could it have begun at last? For decades on end, schools were mutilated by reforms imposed from above, various resolutions of the "stride-forward" or "further-improvement" kind. Now, suddenly, the teachers themselves are on the move. The autumn of 1988 may come to be enshrined in the annals of education as "the autumn of steering committees", for apart from the steering committee to prepare for the Teachers' Convention and the Commission for the Restructuring of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the U.S.S.R., work is also under way at the steering committee of the Union of Teachers and Educationists, the steering committee of the Educational Commune Movement, so long effectively outlawed, family clubs, and the Eureka club, with its organizing convention. Indeed, one might think that, as far as informal organizations are concerned, teachers will soon outstrip their pupils.

But all that, I hear someone say, is going on up in the clouds in Moscow, while at our school, there's nothing doing.

That is not so. At every educational establishment, from the foremost university down to the tiniest village elementary school, we see elections taking place with everyone involved voting for something and someone.

For what, and for whom?

The pivot of democracy is the election of people whom we can all trust to run our lives. In an autocratic state, the quality of life depends largely on the autocrat. In a democratic state, it depends on the quality of elections, which in turn, hinges upon the quality of the candidates proposed, the electoral procedure and, last but not least, the voters. For very specific reasons, we have concentrated on electoral procedure, forgetting the voter, that is, ourselves.

The actual cultural level is never so clearly demonstrated as in the ability to vote in elections of major significance. The voter, his cultural level, his civic dignity, his self-awareness, are precisely what guarantees the irreversibility of change. So Pravda says, and one is forced to agree . For as long as conferences and conventions still vote for a list compiled in advance and in compliance with directives from the podium, heaven knows what may ensue. Indeed, back in the 1930s we willy-nilly put up the hands for a person or thing advised, sometimes for our own liquidation.

Ever since, that is how things have gone. At school, we are taught to vote on the basis of the slothful "but-not-me" principle, to the accompaniment of the teacher's "the sooner we finish the sooner you'll go home!" And so it goes, until we reach old age. Only a few years ago the chairman at an important gathering of creative workers implored: "Comrades, surely we're not going to be stuck here till morning. I, for one, prefer to sleep in my own bed!" Which meant voting for the proposed list without amendments. "Are you suggesting that so-and-so be added? Then who should we delete?", the chairman suggested, and by dishonestly invoking a non-existent directive, sought to keep the list intact. "Cross me off!" somebody suddenly shouted. The chairman kept his cool. I don't now remember what he came up with, but he stuck to the list and everybody went back to bed. Next morning, when they woke up and realized who they had voted for in the wish to get home to bed, they all had that morning-after feeling. However, it was too late. They could only recall how they had shoved the lists into the ballot box without so much as looking at them so that no one couldn't question their conformism. Our ballot boxes were urns containing the ashes of freedom.

So, teacher, teach how to vote, and learn how to vote yourself. Today, after the 19th Party conference, the election of delegates to the Teachers' Convention will be the country's first such major event. This offers educationists a chance to show that they really are in the vanguard, that they can teach others, that they have the right to do so. But if, when casting their votes at a regional conference, they prefer to rush back home to bed, as I have described, then our delegates in Moscow will vote any-old-how, just to be first in line at the snack counter, or have more time for shopping. It must be realized that the people elected today are not chosen so that they can go shopping in Moscow. The fate of the school, of our children, indeed of the delegates themselves, will depend on who is chosen. For instance, one regional education chief may be clever, honest and respected. Why shouldn't he be elected to represent the region? Another may be a vulgar ignoramus, who can't even put two words together. Why should he be elected? After all someone else can be found to head the region's delegation, and this will be the only opportunity you will have to get rid of a nasty bureaucrat. And see to it that the elections are not rigged. In short, don't vote against yourself.

However, it might be difficult to say who's who on a list of sixty. Ah, so-and-so has been given a decoration. But what for? For real work? Or for being a toady? One never knows. Nor is it really feasible for each one to propound his or her own programme. Yet, before the votes are cast, one can ask this or that person whether he or she is in favour of a concept free of habitual fear, which the State Committee for Education has proposed, or of the concept of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences free of any independent thinking. Whether he or she is for or against the pedagogics of cooperation? Whether he or she wants Uchitelskaya Gazeta, (the Schoolteacher's Paper) to keep its name, its editor and its staff, or doesn't care a damn? Whether he or she is for or against the Union of Schoolteachers?

That will be enough. People think before they vote when something depends on an election. And something really depends on the election when people think. So, teach children how to vote, teacher, and learn how to vote yourself! If you don't think before you vote, you get coercion, not democracy.

Simon Soloveichik

Scientist's dilemma

Professor Boris Grushin, Ph.D.

There was a time when bureaucrats held the monopoly on the truth, appropriated the right to control science. Is this not why philosophy, sociology, political economy, ethnography, the theory of culture and other humanitarian sciences are still remote from the requirements of everyday life?

When the 27th Congress of the CPSU went on record that our philosophical and economic thought, and social science in general were somewhat remote from the requirements of practical life, all contingents of social scientists hastened to analyse the situation in their own particular spheres, in an effort to dig down to the roots of this common failing. But to my mind by and large, with few exceptions, their analysis fell short of the mark. For one thing, because of evasion (or perhaps deliberate misrepresentation?) of the issues involved.

It was pointed out at the Congress that there existed a certain ontological relationship between science and life in our society. Subsequent discussion, however, took an entirely different turn; it was held that social science and all those engaged in that field had for one or another reason, including subjective reasons, themselves become divorced from reality, had lagged behind, had not coped with the tasks facing them. In this way the problem was turned from an objective one affecting society as a whole into a subjective, indeed nothing short of an individual, personal problem; it was driven within the confines of the science, and therefore the solutions offered, even the correct ones, were inevitably superficial, partial, unrelated to the substance of the issue.

Yet science derives its vitality from the vitaliy of society itself. Society always has the kind of science it **needs**, wants to have, permits its scientists to have, and, consequently, the kind of science it deserves. And this means that all the specific features, all the problems and all the "secrets" of our social science of yesterday and today are inbuilt in the specific features, problems and "secrets" of our society.

Science and authority

What exactly do I have in mind when I speak of the links between society and science? A great many basic things. The very type, nature, of the "social mandate" objectively imposed by society on science. The niche given to science in society as a whole and in the generation of new ideas. The criteria and requirements according to which society evaluates the results of scientific activity. And, finally, the diverse conditions – financial, organizational, and technical – relating to the training of personnel, the publication of findings, etc. – in which firstly objectively (and only secondly if not tenthly subjectively) social scientists have to work.

Thus, taking all this into account, we find that many negative features of Soviet social science which are usually the subject of criticism and self-criticism are by no means confined only to this particular sphere of the intellectual life of our society. In appraising the situation in social science, it should not be taken in isolation from the others. It should be seen in a context of far broader and more fundamental problems.

As I see it, the most important of these problems is that of the interaction between the structures connected with professional dissemination of social knowledge, on the one hand, and the structures of social administration, on the other – in a word, the interaction between social science and administrative authority.



It is a well-known fact that social knowledge is obtained not only in the "workshops" of science but in all the other departments of society without exception – in everyday life, in art, in the economic and ideological fields. At the same time, the social knowledge derived from these sources is not identical; it differs as regards level of awareness of reality, as regards quality, cognitive value from the standpoint of the depth, objectivity and reliability of perception of the world.

In normal conditions society is fully aware of these differences. Science engages in science and the administration administers. As for the link between the two, it is materialized either in the utilization by the administration of scientific data (keeping track of research findings, holding consultations and expert panels, etc.) or – which is far more effective – in the direct inclusion (guaranteed both by public support and by law) of science in the process of administration, among other things, in the mechanism of decision making.

In our society, at a certain stage in its history, a serious deformation occurred: **governmental bodies arrogated to themselves the right to produce scientific, theoretical social knowledge and** thereby **to control everything** done in that sphere by anyone but themselves. In words they exercised that right **together with science**, but in reality they bypassed science, **ignored it,** even usurped its place, since it was they who had the last word in any theoretical argument on all problems of social science, all the way to historiography and linguistics. Numerous, as a rule, unnamed high-ranking office-holders, as well as far from anonymous bureaucrats with academic degrees, installed in scientific institutions as "organizers of science," were given – by virtue of their very position – the monopoly on the final, absolute truth (which subsequently often turned out to be sheer

nonsense!). As a matter of fact that is how it all began.

Science in the "underground"

The administrators, who as a rule had no education to speak of (apart from the various central, republican, and regional Party, YCL, trade union and other such schools and courses), who as often as not lacked the ability and experience needed for study in the "workshops" of science, and were occupied day in and day out with current administrative functions having nothing in common with the painstaking, arduous labours involved in searching for new theoretical knowledge grain by grain – all these neophytes of philosophy, political economy, theory of art and history could naturally work only at a **non-professional** and hence **non-scientific** level. Nevertheless the empirical notions they concocted (on the basis of their limited personal experience of administration), and also the abstract-scholastic constructions unrelated to experience and indeed as often as not in gross defiance of experience, they produced, were invariably acclaimed as masterpieces of theory, as the very acme of scientiric truth. As a result, a situation emerged which was to play a truly fatal role in the destiny of our professional sociology.

Strictly speaking, social science in general came to be **unwanted,** and, being deprived of its natural place in the life of society, was forced either to withdraw to the **periphery** of the production of social knowledge (as was the case with professional philosophy, ethnography, anthropology and linguistics), or, worse still, to take shelter in the "underground" of that process, to resort to diverse forms of non-institutionalized, domestic (as regards organization) and artisan (as regards method), unobtrusive search for the truth (professional sociology, history, and the political economy of socialism).

This is not to say that there were no specialists in social science left in our country. There were, moreover specialists of world renown. For science cannot be done away with any more than true poetry and painting can. They went on working in spite of everything. But in the existing conditions not only was their work hampered and limited (among other things through denial of access to the public, specifically large-scale publication of their writings), its social significance was belittled; moreover they worked at a risk. To be branded as an eccentric, an anchorite engaged in some solitary, strange, incomprehensible and unnecessary pursuit, or else as an ideological opponent (with the inevitable consequences) as a suspicious, dangerous heretic who dared to march out of step, to question the "infallible truths" – this was for years the lot of a great many well-known and, more frequently, obscure scientific and cultural workers. Suffice it to mention the philosophers Alexander Losyev and Merab Mamardashvili, the literary scholars Mikhail Bakhtin and Yuri Lotman, the sociologist Yuri Levada, the theorist on problems of management Georgi Shchedrovitsky, and the economist Gennady Lisichkin. And how many more were there if you take the country as a whole!

Drawing from Zeit (F.R.G.)

Let me repeat: all these people worked constantly and tirelessly without sparing themselves and regardless of all the hardships and dangers that stalked them. But the trouble was that until very recently their work often had no officially recognized scientific status, it did not fit into the pattern of the existing formal institutions, did not fall in line with the "mainstream development" of science, in a word, it was seen as their **private concern.** Science was considered and **objectively** became something quite different – it was the result of the invasion by the administrators of "workshops" for the production of social knowledge which began, with the help of a system of higher education especially deformed and modified for the purpose, to turn out large contingents of personnel wholly adapted to the new requirements.

Quasi-science

Outwardly such institutions, many of which had the distinction of being associated with the Academy of Sciences, differed but little from those that existed before the revolution and in the first post-revolutionary years: there was no dearth, even a surfeit of holders of academic de-

grees; they had their own full members and corresponding members of the Academy; they had their plans and fulfillment of plans – individual and, more often, collective scientific works were put out. Actually, however, the situation was already qualitatively different.

Instead of chivalrous service to the Truth there was feverish ritualistic pursuit of Gain; needless to say, their own gain and not for the good of society, as was maintained for the benefit of the simpleminded. Instead of critical examination of a subject without kowtowing to authority, wholesale apologetics and lip service to the "truths" propounded by the higher-ups. Instead of constant, dramatic movement toward the new, insipid commentary, endless reiteration and the known, stale and boring old. Finally, instead of concrete analysis of what is and why it is, sterile, scholastic invocations on the subject of what ought to be.

It must be admitted that as a result of such metamorphoses we found ourselves in possession not of science in the strict sense of the word, but a quasi-science similar in every respect to the equally ugly deformations in associated spheres of intellectual endeavour – quasi-literature, quasi-poetry, quasi-art, quasi-music. Previously, too, there had been phenomena of this order. Karl Marx, for instance, in the course of his study of bourgeois political economy, came across an analogous phenomena, which he qualified as vulgar science. But at no other time in the 20th century perhaps has it assumed such dimensions as in our country.

Is it any wonder, then, that this kind of science proved utterly incapable of exerting a positive influence of any kind on social development? By its own definition it was simply projected at something altogether different – at the mass production of unsubstantiated "laws" and "law-governed regularities" (at executive level) and at equally irresponsible apologetics of things as they were (at rank-and-file level). This pseudo-science was doomed from the start to impotence, to total incapacity in resolving the complex problems of being. For, as Marx established in his time, its predominant specific features are, firstly, lack of the basic instrument of scientific perception – the theoretical language of the given science evolved throughout the preceding history of its development, and, secondly, total incompetence to the point of elementary ignorance (not only in research but also in the teaching and popularization of science), the constant substitution for the scientific approach of the political, ideological, journalistic and other approaches, all the way to the most primitive.

Of course, society still had at its disposal real, professional science, which could and should meet the needs of life, actively assist in finding the most effective practical solutions. After all, that science by virtue of its very essence cannot be divorced from reality even when it concerns itself with "distant worlds" – the aesthetics of antiquity, the philosophy of Kant or some altogether super-abstract patterns of communicative processes. But, as I have already said, that science was relegated to the background, made the object of suspicion and censure on the part of the authorities. Of course it cannot be divorced from **reality,** but how easy it is to exclude it from **active participation** in the life of society. That, unfortunately, is exactly what happened in our recent history. And something of the same continues to this day.

* * *

At a recent meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee which adopted a decision to heighten the role of sociology in solving current problems facing our society, the question of why sociology had failed to cope with its tasks at the initial stage of its development in the 1960s was raised. I trust that this article to some extent provides the answer to that question. But in conclusion, as a witness and active participant in the events of those years, I should like to add one eloquent detail connected with the struggle that was waged around sociology towards the end of the first, abortive perestroika.

Appraising the state of affairs in sociology at that time and the clearly defined division of sociologists into "administrators" and "researchers," non-professionals and professionals, a leading Moscow sociologist made this rather apt observation: "We are something like an academic council under Genghiz Khan – if you stick to your guns and speak the truth you sticking your neck out; if you curry favour and lie, you will stay alive but you will demonstrate your utter bankruptcy."

True enough. Equally plain is it that an end must be put to such a state of affairs. Perestroika obliges us to do so. ■

"At least, don't repeat the mistakes that have been made by others," says Professor JARMO LEHTINEN, President of the Service Management Group, one of Finland's largest service management consultancies

What changes have taken place in Soviet services industry over the past few years?

I tried to find an answer to this question while visiting cafeterias, department stores and other public services in Moscow and Vilnius. On the one hand, changes for the better, in varying degrees, are plain to see...

And on the other?

I was depressed by the chronic shortage of goods and services, queues for practically everything, and "hunting" even for prime necessities, let alone durable goods.

I think this is a result of inadequate attention to services industry. But in the economy as in life everything is interconnected. The scarcity of goods and services can retard and is already retarding industrial growth rates and the achievement of the social and economic objectives proclaimed by perestroika.

I would venture to suggest that the Soviet economy is now at a turning point. If you "miss" the stage of development connected with the gradual conversion of a "commodity economy" into an "economy of services industry," the gap between the quality of life in the Soviet Union and other countries will widen still further.

Isn't that a very gloomy prospect?

It has long been believed that a "bright future" can be ensured by quantitative growth in the industries producing capital goods. But today you are producing more steel, tractors, shoes and fabrics than any other country (I'm not talking about quality – that is a subject to be discussed separately). However, you still have a long way to go towards a "welfare state."

In the level of per capita consumption of goods and services, the Soviet Union is far behind not only industrial but also many developing countries. In the opinion of American experts, it is roughly at the level of Italy in 1947.

If people have no possibility of spending the money they earn, any incentive to raise labour productivity and work creatively disappears, social apathy in-

The "shadow" economy and the services industry

reases, and a situation conducive to the owth of a "shadow" economy arises.

In choosing ways of further developing rvices industry, you should not be shamed to turn to the experience of the est.

What does this experience show?

The services industry has been growg very rapidly over the last 10-15 years. many countries in the West the proporon of services in the gross national proct exceeds 50 per cent, whereas in the ited States it has risen to 66 per cent. the 1970s the world market in services rew 2.5 times faster than the commodity arket.

Up to 75 per cent of the economically ctive population is engaged in the nonoduction sphere, as compared with bout 28 per cent in the Soviet Union, as ar as I know.

More than 20 per cent of the United tates' work force was employed in the roduction sphere in 1980. It is estimated nat this proportion will have fallen to 11 er cent by the year 2000 and to 3 per ent by 2030.

This tendency is closely linked with the uality of life and changing social riorities where the information service, ducation, communications and medical are play an increasing role.

What conclusions should we draw in he Soviet Union?

It is important to revise priorities for delopment and discard obsolete tereotypes in investment and social olicies. This will enable you at least to void the mistakes that have been made y others. It is always difficult to correct istakes.

In critical situations, with their country n a hostile environment and governed by an authoritarian regime, for many years he Soviet people worked enthusiastically and unreservedly for the sake of lofty political goals. But the guns have ong been quiet, the "iron curtain" is gradually being raised, the myth of hostile encirclement is being dispelled, and democratization and glasnost are penetrating areas of Soviet life that were previously closed to the public. In these circumstances calls to the people to tighten their belts are unlikely to find a broad response.

In 1985 the Soviet government adopted a comprehensive programme to expand the output of consumer goods and services in the period from 1986 to 2000.

I'm familiar with this programme. But you will probably agree there's nothing in particular to boast of. The output targets for nearly half the products indicated in the programme were not fulfilled in 1986. This shortfall was not overcome last year either.

It should be said that the modern high-quality goods in short supply account for a large percentage of it. By and large, a change for the better in satisfying the market demand for consumer goods and services has not yet occurred.

The government recently adopted a series of decisions for a further expansion in the output of consumer goods and paid services. Do you think they will help improve the situation?

Perhaps. The decisions repeat many provisions of the comprehensive programme. The targets set in them considerably exceed the programme – in the volume of paid services, for instance, by 15 to 20 per cent a year.

I have the impression that the decisions have been worked out in the traditional way. They abound in such words as "oblige," "recommend" and "ensure." Practically nothing is said in them about the need to create a market of goods and services. Yet only a regulated market would improve the situation.

The most important thing, in my view, is to enhance economic incentives for enterprises. Their contribution to the output of goods should not be regarded as a kind of métayage. Such an approach has been taken in Lithuania, for instance. Initiative and efficiency in the use of new administrative, financial and economic mechanisms have enabled that republic



Drawing by Sergei Ainutdinov

to fulfil and even exceed the targets of the comprehensive programme and the plan for retail trade.

But such an approach to the output of consumer goods and services is rather the exception that the rule. Inadequate attention to the expansion of services and the consumer sector as a whole has led to an unprecedented growth of accumulations. I have read that upwards of 260 billion rubles is lying idle in savings banks, and at least 130 billion rubles is being kept by people in their homes. In the long run, the demand for 15 billion rubles' worth of services and 30 billion rubles' worth of consumer goods remains unsatisfied every year. At the same time, 14-16 billion rubles is being spent in the "shadow" economy.

Have you come up against that as well?

This is inevitable when goods and services are in chronic demand. On arriving at the Leningrad railway station in Moscow I saw crowds of people besieging taxicabs. In such "hot" spots, and there are not a few of them in Moscow, the private sector, not the state, dictates its terms to consumers and determines how much they have to pay. A private taxi driver offered to take me to Oktyabrskaya Square for 15 rubles. The driver of a state-owned taxi charged 10 rubles. But I knew that the fare to my hotel was under four rubles.

What is the way out?

In Vilnius, for instance, picking up a taxi is not a problem because about 4,000 private car owners have joined in the enterprise. In Moscow, with a population 16 times that of Vilnius, just over 3,000 private taxis have been registered, and the fare can therefore vary considerably.

The situation is no better in other cooperatives dealing with services. What kind of "shadow" economy can one talk of if the 3,000-odd cooperatives registered in Moscow, with only half of them operating at present, provide less than one per cent of services?

Nevertheless, the bureaucratic apparatus of the local Soviets is sabotaging by hook or by crook the implementation of the law on cooperatives in the U.S.S.R.

Aren't you troubled by cooperative prices?

I am troubled rather by the inferior quality of goods and meagre range of services offered by the cooperatives. At the same time, you are virtually helpless against a cooperator who has sold you a cap that shrinks after the first wash or a pie after which you have heartburn.

The Soviet goods and services market is vast, the consumer is not fussy, and the shortage of goods is enormous. When goods and services are difficult to obtain, and this is admitted today even by your experts, it is ridiculous to talk about quality. The consumer is prepared to buy any inferior product, from cooperatives too, because nothing else is offered to him.

Monopolism is incompatible with quality and low prices. Cooperatives are not yet in a position to compete with the state because there are very few of them. It is necessary to develop both the public and the cooperative sectors simultaneously.

The most unpleasant thing is that the scarcity of goods and lack of competition spoil the producer. That is why I was not surprised at being served rudely in hotels and restaurants, booking offices and barber's shops. I was repeatedly invited to buy things allegedly unavailable anywhere else.

How can one change the psychology of workers engaged in services industry?

The shortage of goods, especially when it's chronic, always tends to create numerous problems. In the West they are quickly resolved. In a planned economy, this does not happen automatically.

Talking with workers employed in services industry, I concluded that they are concerned primarily with satisfying their personal interests or the interests of their managers, but not customers. Many of them are trying to raise their wages not by improving the quality of services provided by them, but thanks to shortages, sometimes artificially created, and they often succeed in achieving their aim.

Only in this way can I explain the situation obtaining at those of Moscow's outdoor greengroceries I was able to visit. One would think the people employed there got their wages for the quantity of vegetables and fruit they spoiled and not for keeping them fresh.

The powerful bureaucratic superstructure over services industry kills any desire on the part of personnel to show initiative and enterprise and try to improve the quality of services. In any case, the greater part of the profit goes to the superior body. In these circumstances every worker begins to act accordingly, that is, follows the system, rather than keeps ahead of it.

What is your impression of the management system in the services sphere?

As far as I understand, a large number of institutions – from the Council of Ministers to the local Soviets and district boards responsible for services industry – are involved in the administration of a given industry.

They are obliged to determine the volume of services provided for the population, study the demand for services, take responsibility for the provision of services, coordinate and control them... Under the government decisions I have mentioned above, all public services establishments have to coordinate their plans for paid services with the governments of constituent republics and local Soviets.

Are they compelled to do so in order to keep administrative personnel in work? Enterprises operating in market conditions are directly interested in expanding the range of services and increasing their quality, and they should not be harassed.

Are there other ways of developing the services sphere in our country?

As a businessman, I should not fail to note the Soviet Union's expanding cooperation with foreign companies and, I would like to hope, with Finnish firms.

How can such cooperation be established?

There are many forms of such cooperation and, given the mutual desire, it can be established without any particular difficulty. The difficulty lies in the poor information available to Finnish companies regarding conditions of work on the Soviet market, a certain fear on the part of my compatriots to establish such cooperation and, unfortunately, the inertia of the Soviet partners. Finnish companies could organize tourist trips between North and West European countries via the Soviet Union, and take upon themselves intermediary functions in the promotion of Soviet goods to the Western, mainly North European markets.

Tempting prospects are opening up in carrying Soviet research and development and ideas through to the manufacturing and marketing stage. I believe you are dissatisfied with the present situation in which only four to five per cent of all inventions are introduced in production. Yet in many fields Soviet basic science holds a leading position.

We are prepared to study potential markets for Soviet goods and services, offer them for sale and organize advanced training courses for managers of joint enterprises.

How much will these services cost?

The cost may seem high, but the profit will be tens, even hundreds of times higher if, from the very outset, you work with interested and skilled partners in an economic environment with which you are unfamiliar.

We are also prepared to discuss the possibility of paying for consultancy and intermediary services after rather than before the completion of joint projects. So the ball is in your court.

Sergei Abramov and Igor Oleinik,
Cand. Sc. (Econ.)

A new government formed

What were the decisions of the plenary meeting of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee?

The plenary meeting of the CPCz Central Committee on ideological work held last week, decided, among other things, to set up commissions to draft a new Party programme, amend the rules of the Party and draw up a new Constitution for the country. It approved a proposal to set up a committee to control Party work in the Czech Socialist Republic and introduce standing commissions of the Central Committee. It decided to hold the next 18th regular congress of the Party in the first half of 1990, that is, earlier than was originally planned. The plenary meeting decided on serious changes in the composition of the top bodies of the CPCz and the governments of the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics. The long-serving Prime Minister of the Federal Government, Lubomir Strougal, and the Prime Minister of the Slovak Socialist Republic, Peter Colotka, left their Party and government posts. Five new members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were elected, and proposals were made for the appointment of a new Prime Minister of the Federal Government as well as new Deputy Prime Ministers and several ministers.

The President of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak, accepted the resignation of Lubomir Strougal and his cabinet and, in keeping with the proposals of the Central Committee of the CPCz and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the National Front, appointed a new federal government led by Ladislav Adamec.

What is behind these changes? What are the reasons for the resignation of one of the most stable governments in the socialist community of nations? Why has the need for change arisen in a country with a stable economy, high living standards and high standards of social welfare? There is practically no difference between the living standards of rural and urban residents in Czechoslovakia. Does the change in the make-up of the government signify a change in the policy adopted by the 17th Congress of the CPCz and subsequent plenary meetings of the CPCz Central Committee, aimed at restructuring?

These questions are justified, the more so as speculation immediately began in the West about what is being termed a crisis in the CPCz and the government of Czechoslovakia, about who has "won" and who has "lost," and about the future of restructuring in Czechoslovakia. In response to these speculations, member of the Presidium and Secretary of the CPCz Central Committee Jan Fojtik told a news conference that, contrary to Western claims, the changes introduced in the government are not an indication of a crisis in the CPCz and the government of the country. The purpose of the plenary meeting of the CPCz Central Committee and the organizational decisions it took is to give fresh impetus to the process of restructuring and thereby create the right prerequisites for holding the 18th congress of the CPC at an earlier date.

And so, the government is new but the line remains unchanged. The Prime Minister who has played an active role in working out and implementing the policy of the CPCz and the Czechoslovak state is gone. New men have come to power.

The new government will have a lot of work to do. The course of restructuring in Czechoslovakia has not been marked solely by success. As the plenary meeting of the Central Committee pointed out, the rate of economic growth has slowed down, the targets for the growth of the national income and certain other indices have not been met, and the social sphere has begun to lag behind. The restructuring of the organizational system of production and research and development have run into serious difficulties. The democratic principles of self-government have not always been observed. The government and some ministries came in for serious criticism at the plenary meeting. In other words, problems persist, and they are found to have an effect on the rate of the proposed reform and the rate at which the market develops. They are also bound to influence public feeling. As the General Secretary of the CPCz Central Committee Milos Jakes pointed out at the plenary meeting, the inadequacy of the home market is having a negative effect on popular attitudes to restructuring, democratization and the efforts to carry out the socio-economic objectives facing the country. He also pointed out that those who have never supported socialism are trying to cash in on the process of restructuring, and, in particular, on the expansion of socialist democracy. Forces attempting to destabilize society have become more active.

Judging from reports in the Czechoslovak press, the new government intends to pursue a firm and uncompromizing policy in dealing with these problems. Addressing the first session of the new government, Ladislav Adamec said that the people will judge the performance of the government by the results attained and not by the scale of the changes in the government's composition. The end results must be the chief criteria of the performance of every ministry. The job of the ministries is better to satisfy the requirements of the people in goods and services, treat people in a fair way, and help them solve their problems.

The new government, he went on to say, will not turn a blind eye to manifestations of mismanagement and other negative phenomena. It will not keep quiet about the manufacture of substandard goods, shortages of goods and medicines, and the poor performance of transport, which has been a source of discontent amongst the working people. The government will not tolerate poor organization and indifference.

The serious changes in the leading bodies of Czechoslovakia have aroused a positive response from society, but, at the same time, some people are wondering whether the plans made by the new government are realistic, and whether it will be able to satisfy the growing requirements of the people. After all, Czechoslvakia's resources are limited. The structure of the economy, investment policy, and outdated production programmes are clearly incompatible with today's requirements. The new government believes, nevertheless, that it will be able to deal with the outmoded organizational structures, managerial methods and ways of thinking.

Alexander Didusenko

Ladislav Adamec, new Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak government, was born in 1926 into a miner's family. A trade academy graduate, he joined the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1946. Ladislav Adamec held the posts of the Chairman of the District National Committee in Frenstat and Deputy Chairman of the Northern Moravia Regional National Committee.

In 1963 he was appointed the head of the Engineering, Metallurgy and Chemistry Department and, later, of the National Economy Department of the CPCz Central Committee. Ladislav Adamec finished the Higher Political School of the CPCz Central Committee and completed the post-graduate course of the Higher School of Economics in Prague. In 1969 he became Deputy, and in 1986 – First Deputy Chairman of the government of the Czech Socialist Republic. In 1987 he became Prime Minister of the Czech government, Deputy Prime Minister of the government of Czechoslovakia.

In 1966, Ladislav Adamec was elected a member of the CPCz Central Committee, and in 1987 – a member of the Presidium of the CPCz CC.

Anatomy of a crisis

Reforms are necessary, but resistance to them is strong, and uncertainty and risks are great

Milija Komatina,
Editor-in-chief of Socijalizam, the journal of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

The 13th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1986 proclaimed and partly worked out three reforms – of the economy, the political system, and the party itself. They were immediately brought up for discussion by party members and the people. But the discussion took place in unfavourable conditions, mainly because of the deepening economic crisis. The ideological differences created an impression of total impotence and an inability to cope with the present situation.

A new factor has emerged in the past few months. The people have become active in political life. This is first of all a result of the growth of socialist self-government and awareness of social relations, which provide for the direct participation of the general public in politics. Secondly, it is also a result of unfavourable tendencies, especially in the autonomous province of Kosovo. This has sparked off an explosion of discontent expressed in meetings and strikes.

Though such popular involvement in politics has complicated the situation, this fact can be regarded as positive, because it will speed up the drafting of reforms and the initiation of social changes. This optimism cannot be diminished by the fact that the broad participation of the people means, to a certain extent, confrontation with the institutions of the system, as the activity of the people is increasing while some of their demands run counter to the basic ideological and political strategy of the LCY.

In the present situation, which is extremely tense for the League of Communists, it is very important that none of the hundreds of thousands of people who chanted different slogans should challenge its historically-won authority. As a political organization which, in addition, has a unifying function, the League of Communists firmly relies on the people's desire to check the disintegration tendencies and proceed to unify the country round the slogan of the struggle for economically effective and politically democratic socialism.

Radivoje Marinkovic,
Director of the Centre of Marxist Studies, the CC of the League of Communists of Serbia, Professor at the Department of Political Sciences

Yugoslav society has come to a crossroads and stopped in hesitation. It is obvious that there is no way back, but it is not clear how to move forward. The leadership is assailed with more doubts than the people. An analysis of the economic crisis and of the Kosovo problem has shown that something in the system does not work. Yugoslav society is divided and disintegrated, politics prevail over the economy, and "self-government" is merely a façade for etatist bureaucratic rule socialization.

The people understand that vitally needed changes are being blocked by dilly-dallying and differences in the leading sections of the bureaucracy, especially by differences between the party and state bureaucracies of the constituent republics. Therefore, in the course of strikes, meetings and protest demonstrations, the people, guided by the desire to preserve Yugoslavia's unity, socialism and self-government, are spontaneously combining their efforts and demanding reforms.

Such a spontaneous mobilization has become a new feature of political life. The people have understood that reforms also presuppose changes in the leadership, and have made these changes one of their principal demands. The immense social energy released during the spontaneous mobilization of the people has breached walls concealing not a few secrets, and in this way has cleared the way for openness and extensive criticism.

Under the pressure of this energy, some of the provincial leaderships are being brought down, top party leaders and statesmen are resigning, local government bodies and the character of party discussions are changing, and meetings of higher bodies are being held in public. The social energy of the masses is becoming a major factor for reform.

It is admitted by everyone that three reforms – of the economy, the political system, and the League of Communists – have to be carried out in Yugoslavia.

The economic reform is intended to put an end to the state domination of the economy, bureaucratic voluntarism, and the narrow orientation of the economy. Its purpose is to apply the laws of modern commodity production and the market mechanism, and to help the country actively participate in present-day world processes. The market economy calls for an integrated Yugoslav market.

The reform of the political system is designed to provide more powers for the federal bodies. It is opposed most fiercely not by the people but by the provincial elite, who seek to retain their own autonomy and dominant positions.

The purpose of the reform of the LCY is to make it the leading force of the reforms, and simultaneously help the party to reorganize itself. It envisages the democratization of relations within the party's ranks and the consistent implementation of the principle of democratic centralism instead of its trend towards federalization. The reform also provides for more vigorous work by the LCY in clarifying the theoretical and ideological doubts regarding socialist and self-government development. The LCY's members, especially its leaders, are today divided on this issue. But the League of Communists holds the key to reforms in society, and the reform of the party is therefore the main necessity.

Reforms are necessary, but resistance to them is strong, and uncertainty and risks are great. Under the pressure of the crisis there is often no chance to examine every step or initiative critically.

Compiled by Vladimir Grishny,
our own correspondent
BELGRADE

Credibility gap

Gennady Sysoyev

Yugoslavia at a crucial moment

A wave of demonstrations and rallies has swept a number of regions of Yugoslavia. Several members of the top party leadership have resigned. At the insistence of tens of thousands of people who went out onto the streets, the leadership of the Vojvodina League of Communists and the government of Montenegro have resigned. The President of the Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia announced the other day that the events could lead to a state of emergency.

This is merely a record of events and facts. Briefly, the present situation can be described in one word – crisis. Of course, the time has not yet come to draw final conclusions (the people and the leadership will have to do that). Nevertheless an assessment of the events can be made.

Over the past few years the situation in Yugoslavia has been complex and has now considerably deteriorated. It can be said that the country is going through a crucial period in its history.

Yugoslavia is about to launch an extensive reform designed to reverse adverse trends in the economy and substantially raise living standards, which have fallen in some cases to the 1960s level. It is also necessary to make amendments in the constitutions of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. The discussion and coordination of the amendments is not going smoothly. Their purpose is to consolidate the unity of the Yugoslav federation.

Lastly, the situation has recently been exacerbated in the autonomous province Kosovo, which has become "the country's neuralgic knot," nationalism has put down deep roots in the region, which is inhabited mostly by Albanians, and the question has been raised there of creating an "ethnically homogeneous" Kosovo.

The "Kosovo problem" has influenced many events in Yugoslavia. In different regions of the country meetings have been held in solidarity with Serbs and Montenegrins who have left Kosovo under pressure from Albanian nationalists. The meetings have already been attended by more than three million people.

The prevailing opinion is that the reform should be accompanied by a personal shake–up, and, to ensure that the changes are fully implemented, they must be effected first of all in the leadership. Public discontent, which has spilled over into the streets, shows that confidence in the leading bodies has fallen off. Almost all the demonstrations and rallies have demanded that those who have not justified the people's trust should be brought to book. This is a key point in the assessment of the political situation in the country.

The people show their trust in a man by electing him a leader. If this trust is lost, a crisis of confidence ensues. I think this is what has happened in Yugoslavia. The public has levelled charges against 43 members of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. They have been accused of inactivity, abuses of power, and loss of contact with the masses.

The need for a personnel shake-up is also understood by the Yugoslav leadership. It was discussed at the LCY Central Committee meeting on October 17 and 18. Serious mistakes in daily work and disregard for the just demands of the people were mentioned as the principal reasons for leaders' resignations. Indecision and mistakes lead to a deteriorating political situation and loss of initiative, which is sometimes caught up by people who capitalize on the difficulties.

But the country's future cannot be decided outside the institutions and bodies of the political system. Whether or not they can function and enjoy authority is another matter.

The Central Committee of the LCY has set up a working group to examine the validity of the charges brought against the various party leaders. Following the example of the central committees of several republics, the party leadership has also decided to study the material conditions of members of the LCY Central Committee and its Presidium: responsible posts should not be used for the personal enrichment of those who hold them.

The leadership is now being compelled to waste much energy coordinating the positions of republics and provinces, instead of vigorously implementing a common strategy for a way out of the crisis. The disintegrating League of Communists of Yugoslavia is losing the ability to negotiate the rapids that the country is encountering like a rowing eight without a cox, the weekly Komunist commented recently. Even members of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, its President Stipe Suvar admits, are to a large extent "captives" of their party organizations.

Most of Yugoslavia's problems are believed to be a result of the isolation of its constituent regions. Decentralization and the dismantling of powerful bureaucratic centres has also had adverse effects. The Yugoslav press is now writing about a process of disintegration.

There are different kinds of crises. Some lead to a collapse and the loss of formerly held principles and ideals. But there is another type of crisis, coming after a long illness, which means a turning point in the process, the beginning of a recovery. It can be said that the Yugoslav crisis is one of development, albeit in a very acute form.

The successful implementation of the reforms should lead to stabilization, though this will not be easy to achieve. One further point is important. Yugoslavia can emerge successfully from the crisis only as a single entity. None of its constituent republics or provincies, nations or nationalities can cope with this task on their own.

Two decades of reform

What has checked socio-economic change in Hungary? Does the political system need change? What could the new model of socialism be like?

Hungary's Minister of Justice **KALMAN KULCSAR** answers these and other questions.

The need to restructure socio-economic management was being already felt in Hungary in the mid-1960s. However, the process of reforms dragged on. Why?

I think this question should be viewed historically but, of course, without going too far back into the past. It is common knowledge that in the first decades after World War II and the setting up of the people's democratic republic, Hungary copied the Soviet model of economic development. Some elements of this model promoted the modernization of the economy. But there were also others which, in the conditions prevailing in Hungary, failed to work. Setbacks piled up, and already at some time in the mid-1960s it was evident that the socio-economic structure that had been formed in the country could not function effectively.

Warehouses were packed with goods for which there was no demand, which could be sold neither on the domestic market, nor abroad. Their value exceeded the sums spent annually on defence. The pace of economic development slowed down and we began to lag perceptibly behind the developed countries technically. Finally, the political methods of government, too, ceased to correspond to the level of development of Hungarian society. There was an urgent need for change. The economic reform begun in the mid-1960s was to have marked the start of these changes. And it did produce certain results. But because of the unfavourable external and certain internal conditions, the reform came to a halt at the beginning of the 1970s.

Could you explain that in greater detail?

To begin with, political and ideological problems appeared. There was a big difference in the incomes of the various sections of the population. Agriculture, where the reform had begun earlier, was developing rapidly, and the countryside was flourishing. Farmers were earning good money. The rapid increase in farm output was largely ensured by produce from home allotments. They produced about half the total output of meat, vegetables and fruit. At this point, certain people in the leadership began to fear that the growth of farmers' incomes could lead to the working class losing its hegemony. Home allotments were heavily taxed. As a result, farm output dropped, while the prices of food increased, and that, in the final count, badly hit the pockets of wage earners.

Could such an outcome have been foreseen? Of course it could. However, the political leadership of the country at the time disregarded the warnings. Nor was it taken into account that traditional farmers were in a minority in the villages. Today rural dwellers are chiefly industrial and office workers. 70 per cent of the home allotments belonged to them. And the high taxes therefore hit not only the farmers, but also a considerable section of the working class and other working people.

That was one of the reasons why the implementation of the reforms was stalled. To that it should be added that in 1972 the CC of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party adopted a decision intended to strengthen the role of the working class in the country. But this decision also included as its concept of working class sections of society which do not belong to that category. And, on the other hand, it gave workers at big state-run enterprises considerable privileges. As a result this set in motion a process of artificially merging small factrories, which led to the appearance of industrial giants at a time when throughout the world the role of small and medium factories was on the increase, as they had proved their economic efficiency in the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution.

That was also the time when the country's foreign debt began to increase. It should be said that in itself a foreign debt is not a serious problem if the foreign currency is used in the right way. But the exact opposite happened. The greater part of the loans was invested in traditional structures: raw material mining, the development of the metallurgical industry, the production of semifinished products and so on. And the rest of the money was used directly for consumption. There is no need to explain the underlying political reason for this. In short, personal consumption increased by 25 per cent between 1974 and 1979 at the expense of loans from abroad.

By the beginning of the 1980s it had become clear that the reform had to be carried through to the end. But the situation in which this was to be done had become more difficult and complex. Another factor was that the measures we resorted to in the interests of the reform were not always compatible with its aims.

A contradiction emerged – the economy was being modernized, while the social and political structures remained largely the same as those drawn up in keeping with the Soviet model of the 1930s and 1940s. Certain steps were taken to adjust this situation. For instance, two or more candidates were nominated for election to posts of leadership at various levels. Local self-government was extended and so on. But there was no real reform in the political system. in the mid-1980s political leaders only paid lip service to the need for social and political steps to remedy the situation. And this continued until 1987, until the Plenum of the CC HSWP insisted on getting to grips with the problem.

The decisions of the party conference this summer confirmed the correctness of the conclusions reached in the course of the nationwide discussion of the political changes: that the implementation of socio-economic reforms should help Hungary to provide the answer to two challenges. One stems from the level of development already achieved, and the second from the need to become part of

Young people want reform. Mass meeting in support of the reform at the Budapest Polytechnic. *Photo by MTI–TASS*

the worldwide economic and political system. Naturally, the right answer can only be found on the basis of our own possibilities, with due regard for the conditions existing in the country and by correcting our own mistakes. And that does not concern Hungary alone. For it is not only the progress of socialism, but also, possibly, its very existence, that hinges on the success of the reform. (That, of course, in no way means that the changes in the other fraternal countries must be exactly the same as in ours. The concrete historic, economic, social and political situation and specific national features must be taken into account everywhere.)

You spoke of the mistakes made in the past. But what is the strategy for reform today? How do you see the concrete way to changes?

This strategy was set out in sufficient detail at this year's party conference. I should like to touch on just two aspects, concerning the law and socio-political life. First of all, it is essential to create a legal framework for the normal functioning of the economy. Economic managers know that two things influence economic efficiency. On the one hand, the market with its supply and demand, the availability of the necessary raw materials, energy resources and a work force with specific professional skills. All that characterizes the **real situation** in which an enterprise has to operate. On the other hand, there is the **normative situation,** the system of norms stemming from existing laws. This includes the tax system, financial conditions, trade and other acts and statutes, which either give enterprises freedom to manoeuvre or, on the contrary, tie their hands.

When these two aspects fail to back each other up, the economy has difficulty functioning properly. If there are internal contradictions in the normative system, then the effect of the different normatives is contradictory, and economic managers cannot correctly forecast the consequences of their decisions or actions. Incidentally, the more normatives and rules exist and the lower their level, the greater the chances of contradictory situations arising. Unfortunately, in Hungary there are still far too many rules and regulations in the economci field. Yet the realities of life are pushing economic managers towards independence, and increasingly often they ignore the rules and act as the real situation demands. But such a situation cannot be considered normal either. A clear-cut legal framework is needed which would allow them to abide by the principle that "you can do anything not prohibited by the law" (approximately the same as is planned in the U.S.S.R.). In other words, the law must ensure that there is plenty of room for initiative.

What is being done now to ensure this?

A law is being drafted on companies and associations. Its purpose is to ensure that different forms of associations of working people can be set up in the national economy. The draft was considered by the Council of Ministers. Parliament began debating it this month. The bill provides for extremely diverse forms of enterprise – state, cooperative and individual – and specifies the possibility of using foreign capital. One could describe it as something like a constitution for economic life. Naturally, many existing laws and acts will be improved. And we have no intention of allowing various orders, instructions, decisions and other such documents to be issued at lower levels, as this could distort the principles set out in the new law.

Naturally, numerous controversial issues arose in the course of the drafting of the law, especially concerning private enterprise, joint-stock companies, etc. For instance, some people doubt whether the country's economy will remain a socialist economy if 25-30 per cent of the capital invested in it falls into private hands. But one should remember that practically everything was nationalized in Hungary in 1949. Only something like one per cent remained in the hands of the private sector. Meanwhile in the G.D.R. the private sector accounts for about 16 per cent and plays an important role in satisfying public requirements, and this in no way hinders the development of the socialist economy. Historically, the total abolition of the private sector in Hungary was unjustified, and this situaton now has to be remedied.

Mankind, as you know, has created different methods of organzing its economic activities. Unfortunately, in the past we often looked only at the ideological aspect of this and shut our eyes to the economic one.Yet, if one approached the matter from an economic position, then one has to admit, for instance, that though joint-stock companies appeared under capitalism, that in no way means that they cannot be used under socialism as well. Today we have to take a new look at things and determine what is **specific to socialism**, and what in the organization

of the economy is universal. No one, for instance, regards scientific and technical progress as an exclusive feature of only one kind of social system. And I'm not sure that the organizational form of an enterprise has any meaning other than the economic one.

That, in my view, also applies to political life. In Hungary the entire system of political institutions is being renovated. We know how long ago the concept of sharing supreme power was elaborated. Montesquieu wrote of it in his time. In the past we believed that this principle did not suit us, that it applied to a bourgeois society. But that is not quite the case, and we can make use of it no less successfully, since it is a universal organizational-technical principle with the help of which socialism too could resolve many important problems. For instance, it would make the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual more difficult.

In other words, it is a question of a new approach not only to the development of the economy, but to the political system as well. In this respect, the Hungarian legal system is developing in the manner that is specific to it. First and foremost, we propose to take another look at the constitution we adopted in 1949. Although a number of amendments have since been introduced, basically it reflects a past period in our history. Today it no longer meets the requirements of society. We shall have to produce a new constitution or make radical changes in the existing one. Work on this has laready started.

The initial draft of the new constitution has to be ready by 1990. But there are problems that have to be resolved today. Because changes are taking place and people do not want to wait until we have completed work on the constitution. As it is, we are several years behind. The present Constitution, for instance, proclaims the right of citizens to set up various organizations, associations, and hold meetings. But no concrete guarantees for these rights exist. That's why, as a matter of urgency, we have had to sit down and draw up special laws on the freedom of meetings and freedom of associations. The drafts are already being discussed in the Patriotic People's Front and in December will be passed on to the State Assembly.

Or take another example: in the past decisions taken by bodies of state power could be revised only by those bodies themselves. The public is insisting that in the new conditions this right should belong to the courts. Certain conditions for this are already being created. For example, it has been decided to set up a constitutional court. It would be independent and would enjoy extensive rights. The restructuring of legal bodies will probably have been completed before the new constitution comes into force.

To this it should be added that a reform of the electoral system is being prepared. The Hungarian trade unions have suggested that a special law on the trade unions be drawn up. So, as well as a new constitution, we also have to create a whole set of new laws.

Such work is also under way within the party. A search is being made for new forms and methods of work for party organizations, the party's role in society is being revised, and so on. So there too we can expect substantial renovation. Comrade Karoly Grosz spoke of this at the party conference.

How do you visualize the optimal model of socialism today?

That's not an easy question. And I cannot give a full and final answer yet. I can only express my own view, the view of a research scholar who has given much thought to the matter.

The existence of socialism has greatly influenced all development, including the development of capitalism. In the course of the competition with socialism, many elements of high-level social benefits for the working people have appeared in the capitalist countries. So capitalism has thrown down a new challenge to socialism. And since we believed and still believe that socialism should be superior to capitalism, it is clear that the model of the 1930s and 1940s no longer meets the requirements of today. It has to be renovated.

So what we have to do is to have a very careful look, penetrating deep into the existing model and taking from it all that is useful and progressive, while rejecting all that is obsolete or mistaken. A renovated socialist society must be highly effective economically as well as in all other respects. When setting up such a society, it is of course imperative to take into account national traditions, the level of economic, social and political development, and so on. As I see it, the optimal model of socialism must not only incorporate the finest achievements of developed capitalism, but also surpass them.

Interviewer APN correspondent
YURI LYSENKO

The political weekly New Times provides a full and clear picture of highlights in the Soviet Union and the world

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Psychiatry and politics

unlawful confinement in a mental hospital npossible today? Did Soviet psychiatrists err pplying their diagnoses to dissidents?

ur observer Lev Yelin talks to **lexander CHURKIN,** chief ychiatrist at the U.S.S.R. nistry of Health.

ne view that psychiatry in the S.S.R. is used to clamp down on dis- ents is not exclusive to the Western ss. Academician Sakharov has tten on the subject, and some of our ders also believe it to be true. How uld you comment on this?

ecently television showed a cumentary film, "The Secrets of the rd Basket," which includes an episode out three patients undergoing compul- y treatment in a special mental hospi- in Kazan. In the West all three of them described as "dissidents illegally held a mental asylum," and their names fi- re on all the "lists" frequently sent to . I don't think the film director's choice facts was fortuitous. From a psychiat- t's point of view, the cases of these ee patients can be used as graphic amples to demonstrate all aspects of e problem...

The following is the diagnosis given for e patients in question by laymen friends mine, based on what they saw in the evision programme. That the first pa- nt, who aired his deranged ideas, suf- ed from a serious mental illness was lf-evident to each of them. On the sec- d, who was "fighting to build a new ciety" and staging explosions in public aces, opinion was divided: those who ought him normal referred in their argu- ents to members of Narodnaya Volya eople's Freedom), the "red brigades" d other political organizations that re- rted to terror to achieve their ends... As r the third, who had begun his "political reer" in a prison camp where he served term for vicious hooliganism, my ac- uaintances unanimously pronounced him normal... Well, I am extremely familiar with the lives and case histories of all three. I have no doubt whatsoever that they suffer from mental disturbances which qualified them as not answerable for their actions, and relieved them from of criminal responsibility.

In my opinion, the until recently closed nature of our society in general and even more closed nature of psychiatric matters in particular proved a major cause of rumour and talk. The pall of secrecy over normal "dissidents" and mentally ill "dissidents," lack of extensive fair information about them and society's ignorance of the symptoms and forms of development of mental illness all led to a situation in which some regarded all dissidents without exception as mentally ill, while others were convinced that, on the contrary, absolutely all of them were normal... The information gap led to rumours, speculation and sometimes propaganda fabrications.

Have you personally ever dealt with this problem? If so, have you yourself ever encountered questionable practices?

In recent years I have had to deal a lot with the question of mentally ill "dissidents." Almost 300 case histories have been thoroughly analyzed and I venture to say that I have come upon none where the psychiatrists had pronounced an obviously normal person mentally ill, not to mention an official "policy," as some in the West try to allege... At the same time, I have to admit that I have sometimes stumbled on cases of so-called hyperdiagnosis, where the symptoms and severity of the mental disturbance were less pronounced than those diagnosed by the specialists.

As for example?

For example, the case of Bashkir Nizametdin Akhmetov. This man committed repeated crimes, and while serving his term began to write verse, I would say of an anti-Soviet nature. Presently it was smuggled abroad. Before long Akhmetov was awarded a literary prize in the F.R.G. Akhmetov suffered from an obvious form of mental illness, and the psychiatrists who examined him pronounced him not answerable for his actions and sent him for compulsory treatment... Now, however, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health experts, on reviewing the case history, have arrived at the conclusion that the degree of mental disturbance was not so grave as to qualify him as unaccountable for his actions... Anna Mikhailenko, a resident of the Odessa Region who is well known in the West (she had written and distributed anti-Soviet texts), was hospitalized in a special mental clinic. To my mind, this was an unjustifiably harsh measure, and judging from her condition, Mikhailenko could have been sent for compulsory treatment in an ordinary mental home...



Where is she now?

At home. Upon completing the course of treatment, forensic medicine experts pronounced her sound.

You said that some 300 dissidents' case histories have been analyzed, but have so far referred to only two diagnostic errors. What was the full number?

Experts put the number at 18. But, mind you, these are retrospective assessments. By diagnostic error I mean cases of hyperdiagnosis such as Akhmetov's or a wrong choice of treatment enforced by a ruling in court, as in the case of Mikhailenko. It is not my intention to vindicate any of my colleagues,

but, believe me, the diagnosis of mental disorders is a very complex thing and mistakes do occur as they do, incidentally, in other medical disciplines as well. Moreover, mindful of the fact that psychiatry tends to have a marked social aspect, regardless of the system of government, one cannot discount the factor of social consciousness also having an influence on the psychiatrist. For instance, how should one regard an attempt at self-immolation in Red Square? Which is it, behavior compelled by the paranoiac raving of a madman, or an act of self-sacrifice? It is impossible to know for sure unless we painstakingly examine the life and specific personality features of the individual concerned, not forgetting that doctors also vary in their professional skill...

Do you know of cases where psychiatry is used anywhere in the world to suppress dissidents?

I am not familiar with specific data... Amnesty International, however, has made such charges against a whole number of socialist, developing and capitalist countries. I cannot say how well founded these are. For example, I have read in the foreign press of psychotropic drugs being used to achieve "behavior modification" in U.S. and British prisons. But is it true, I wonder?...

On the other hand, all civilized countries have laws exempting the mentally ill from penal servitude, which includes sentences for crimes against the state or government. Therefore there are clinics for mental patients who have committed offences in many countries, including the U.S., Britain, France, Canada...

What factors now determine the need to hospitalize a mental case? What has changed since the adoption early this year of the rules on conditons and procedures for providing psychiatric aid?

The law now provides for the hospitalization in mental clinics of people who volunteer for treatment, patients delivered by means of the ambulance service because of mental conditions that constitute a danger to themselves and others, or those who have committed acts that are dangerous to society and are recognized by a court as not responsible for their actions and sent for compulsory treatment. The list of medical indications for urgent hospitalization has been drastically reduced, and social indications have been removed from the list altogether. In all cases of urgent hospitalization, the patients' relatives and the chief psychiatrist of the senior medical authority are notified, and the patient is examined within the first twenty-four hours by a group of psychiatrists to decide whether hospitalization is justified. In the event of prolonged treatment in a mental clinic, the question of whether the treatment should be terminated or continued is considered by the board of doctors at the clinic every month and by the chief psychiatrist's commission every six months. The new regulations have led to a reduction in the number of hospitalizations, and today from 10 to 30 per cent of beds in mental hospitals are empty.

Could you give your assessment of recent specific instances when unlawful hospitalizations have taken place and been reported in the Soviet press?

The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health has thoroughly examined all these facts. Summing up, I can say that absolutely all hospitalized patients have proved to be suffering from mental disturbances beyond any doubt, though the same cannot be said, however, of the justifiability of hospitalization in some cases... The current regulations strictly stipulate the indications for hospitalization without the patient's consent, i.e., when he poses danger to himself and those around him. However, in some cases, featured in the press, these indications were not present and hospitalization was carried out in violation of the instructions. Those at fault are severely punished, but I am worried, however, that some doctors are still making the decision to hospitalize too lightly, as they did until recently... Therefore much has now to be done to change traditional approaches to dispensing psychiatric help.

The democratization of Soviet society has also had an impact on the approach to the compulsory treatment of the mentally ill guilty of committing anti-state and anti-Soviet acts. Now only those anti-Sovietists who are also guilty of encroachments on citizens' life and health are still kept in mental hospitals. The rest have been transferred to ordinary mental hospitals or allowed to go home. Some of them later emigrated to the West.

Again I would like you to give examples...

Here is one case... Vassily Shipilov, born 1928. He faced trial several times for violating residence rules and for vagrancy. Then, in the late 1950s, he was charged with anti-Soviet propaganda. The court, however, called his sanity into question, and Shipilov was sent to the Professor Serbsky Central Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Psychiatry for examination. There a commission of medical experts certified him schizophrenic and recommended that the court send him for compulsory treatment. The patient was held in special mental asylums until the court revoked the compulsory treatment. In late 1987 Shipilov was transferred to the Krasnoyarsk mental hospital and later was put into a boarding home for the mentally deranged, as having neither a place to live, nor any relatives to depend on.

In 1987, different organizations in Britain began to show great interest in Shipilov. A clergyman chained himself to the railings in Trafalgar Square as a protest against "the illegal confinement of clergyman Shipilov." As for his interest in religion, Shipilov had developed it over the previous year or two. He had only had four years at school and had never had

A LAWYER'S COMMENTS

A compromise?

Psychiatry and human rights

The mentally disturbed in need of treatment are traditionally divided into two categories. One category includes people who perpetrate socially dangerous acts when of unsound mind, or become deranged after committing a crime. The other includes sick people who need mental treatment, but have not broken the law.

The procedure for treating the first category is governed by the Criminal Code. As for the second, treatment is regulated by the rules on the conditions and procedures for providing psychiatric aid, endorsed by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in its edict of January 5, 1988. This document specifies a range of important rules forbidding restrictions on the rights and lawful interests of sick people solely on the grounds of them being under psychiatric supervision or in a psychiatric hospital, provides for the presence of a lawyer and institutes an inspectorate of public prosecutors.

However, an impartial juridical analysis of this bill reveals it to be largely a compromise between the departmental interests of the U.S.S.R. ministries of Health and Justice and the Procurator's Office of the U.S.S.R., on the one hand, and the lawful interests of Soviet citizens on

religious education... Prime Minis- Margaret Thatcher also raised the pilov question during her visit to the .S.R.

n June 1988 Shipilov received an in- tion from British human rights ampions," was dismissed from the me and left for London. I can well gine his hosts' disappointment on getting such a mental case on ir hands.

What are the relations between the .S.R. Ministry of Health, on the e hand, and the Ministry of the In- ior and the KGB on the other, with ard to the hospitalization of peole o make anti-Soviet statements?

he relations between psychiatrists l law-enforcement officers rest on basis of legislative and normative s and among other things, on use 4 of the above Regulations, ch states that "the psychiatrist, n performing his duties related to g medical aid to the mentally ill preventing them from perpetrating ially hazardous acts, is independent is decisions, and governed only by dical indications and the law." erefore, when militia or KGB officers st a citizen for anti-Soviet behavior, if they have any doubts about his ntal condition, they turn for consul- on to a psychiatrist who examines patient, and only in cases where the above medical indications are manifest, does he make a decision on urgent hospitalization in a mental clinic. In doubtful cases, the doctor recommends carrying out a statutory forensic-medical examination.

However, we know of cases where psychiatrists have failed to come up to the mark in such situations. A case described in the newspaper Moscow News provides an example of this. A medical student tried to enter the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, but was apprehended by militiamen. The young psychiatrist called by them for consultation made the decision to hospitalize the detainee. Incidentally, no pressure, as it later transpired, was exerted on the doctor by the militia... When the detainee was brought to a mental clinic, the more experienced doctors who examined him there could not find any grounds for urgent hospitalization, and he was immediately allowed to go home...

How many mental hospitals are there in the U.S.S.R.? Can Western representatives visit them? Has this question ever been raised?

There are now about 700 mental homes and psycho-neurological clinics with in-patient departments. Moreover, this year the Ministry of the Interior is giving us 11 special mental hospitals designed for the compulsory treatment of particularly dangerous mental cases. The other such homes will be dismantled. Ordinary mental hospitals have never been closed to visits from foreign specialists, and every year hundreds of our foreign colleagues visit them. We have offered and continue to offer psychiatrists from abroad the opportunity personally to examine the people they take an interest in. When examining patients here in the Soviet Union, most psychiatrists agree that they are suffering from mental illnesses, but are not in a hurry to admit it at home... Several years ago a delegation of Austrian psychiatrists headed by Professor Harrer visited the U.S.S.R. They examined some "dissidents" – mental cases. Professor Harrer published an article in which he acknowledged that all of them really were mentally ill. At home in Austria, the mass media and his colleagues boycotted him.

There is a tentative arrangement that in November a delegation of American psychiatrists will come to the U.S.S.R. and be able to meet any patients and visit any mental hospitals of their choice, including special mental asylums.

We have no secrets from our foreign colleagues now that we are talking openly about our problems – the more so as problems in psychiatry exist the world over. ■

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ther. It would appear that terests of the official or- ations dovetailed when the was being drafted. The S.R. Ministry of Health d not seem to be interested activities of the psychiatric ce being independently tored by the procurator's es and law courts. The Pro- tor's Office of the U.S.S.R. the Ministry of Justice d appear to have their is too full to bother to see if are reasonable grounds for iving mentally disturbed ns of their freedom.

e bill fully relegates the ng of a person in a hiatric hospital without his ent or the consent of his re- es, or legal representatives e competence of psychiat- Now, we believe that this counter to articles 54 and f the U.S.S.R. Constitution, h guarantee personal im- ty and the right of citizens he legal defence of their onal freedom. It also runs counter to the draft of the code of principles and basic provisions for ensuring the protection of persons suffering from mental disorders elaborated by the United Nations. This last document relegates any decision involving hospitalization to the competence of a law court, health commission or other competent body, and such a decision is taken only after the necessary preparation and examination.

As I see it, it is essential for the Prosecutor to issue sanctions in order forcibly to place a person in a psychiatric hospital. There are some cases that entitle the Prosecutor to do so. Article 188 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code provides for this in the case of a defendant or suspect who has not been detained. So why is anybody who is not guilty of any crime deprived of his constitutional guarantee of inviolability when placed in a psychiatric hospital under the new bill?

Furthermore, the bill proceeds from the premise that anyone forcibly hospitalized on the recommendation of a psychiatrist may be held there for what is effectively an indefinite period, even though the provision is made that once every six months the chief psychiatrist, proceeding from a decision by a commission of psychiatrists, will decide to extend or otherwise the period of hospitalization. I do not think this ensures the observance of the constitutional guarantees of personal immunity or conforms to the aforementioned U.N. document, which specifies that there must not only be a limited term of hospitalization, but also a legislatively mandated periodical juridical revision of each case. What is clearly meant here is a periodical investigation by the law courts of the legality of the forcible isolation of individuals from society. The provision the bill makes for appealing to a law court through the ordinary channels against the chief psychiatrist's decision does not supply the answer. After all, we are speaking of the mentally disturbed, for whom it is no easy matter to write or submit an appeal or even to invite a lawyer, as many of them have no families. Further, the bill specifies neither the procedure for obtaining legal assistance, nor the rights of the sick person while hospitalized. Finally, the procedure for the jurisdiction of the control of public prosecution over the psychiatry service is not defined either.

It is to be regretted that there was no extensive and open discussion when the relevant bill was in preparation. Nor was there any discussion at the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet session on May 24 when the January 5 edict was made law.

Besides improving the operative legal norms, we ought also to consider a foundation for the benefit of mental cases.

Professor
STANISLAV BORODIN
LL.D

Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko is to publish the initial chapters of his book, "Beria," in the magazines Zvezda and Yunost. When the book is released shortly by Moskovsky Rabochiy Publishers, Soviet readers will be introduced to an author recently familiar only to the small circle that had the opportunity of reading literature about the Stalin era during the period of stagnation.

Anton, who entered the department of history at the Moscow Teachers' Institute at the age of 15, graduated when only 19. In 1940 he was arrested, and with short breaks spent the succeeding years in Stalin's concentration camps until 1953. Upon his release he wrote a book about his father, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, who took an active part in the October 1917 revolution and who was shot in 1938 along with many of his old Bolshevik comrades, when Stalin recalled him from his post as Consul-General in Barcelona.

Most of the material he has assembled consists of the recollections of old Bolsheviks who survived the Stalin terror. He wrote a book about Stalin which was published abroad in several languages in 1980 under the title "Portrait of a Tyrant." As for his latest book on Beria, he has had to surmount many hurdles. He is also preparing a new edition of his book on Stalin for the Soviet reading public.

"I must live long enough to tell the whole truth about Stalinism," he says.

* * *

The health of 69-year-old Greek Premier **Andreas Papandreou,** who recently underwent a heartoperation in a London clinic, is currently in the limelight. Though the Egyptian surgeon who operated on him is satisfied with the condition of the leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and says he is already mobile, the Greek public are worried, as for many this prominent politician and veteran of the European socialist movement embodies an entire chapter in the history of Greece.

Andreas Papandreou, who has been a professional politician for some fifty years, was

born on the Island of Chios into the family of Georgios Papandreou, a prominent Greek politician. In 1938, during the reactionary Metaxas dictatorship, he was arrested for the first time. This was followed by some years in exile, his return in the early 1960s, a second arrest and again exile.

He returned to Greece in 1974, after the dictatorial regime of the "black colonels" had collapsed, and founded PASOK, which seven years later polled 48 per cent of the total vote at the general election and formed a one-party government. PASOK repeated this achievement at the 1985 elections.

One can easily understand the concern over the illness of the ruling party's leader, as a general election is to take place next summer. Will Papandreou be able properly to discharge his duties as Premier and leader of PASOK? Will he lead his party to a new electoral victory? Since PASOK has no equal to

Our new ambassador in Afghanistan

Yuli Vorontsov, 59, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., has been appointed Soviet ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Yuli Vorontsov held a succession of posts in the Second European Department, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Organizations Department and the U.S.S.R.'s Permanent Representation at the United Nations. For ten years he worked at the Soviet Embassy in the United States as a counsellor and a minister-counsellor. He was later named Soviet ambassador to India (1977-83) and France (1983-86). Recently, Yuli Vorontsov has been dealing actively with the problems connected with the settlement in Afghanistan, and has repeatedly visited Iran, Pakistan and Geneva in this connection. As Yuli Vorontsov presented his credentials, President Najibullah of Afghanistan said he regarded the assignment of the prominent Soviet diplomat to Kabul as a sign of the Soviet leadership's special attention to the people of Afghanistan.

Yuli Vorontsov is the first career diplomat to have been appointed to the post of Soviet ambassador in Kabul in recent years.

He replaces **Nikolai Yegorychev,** 68, who has been Soviet ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan since March of this year, and is now retiring.

A professional Party worker, Nikolai Yegorychev was Second, and then First Secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee from 1961 to 1967. Literaturnaya Gazeta recently



revealed that his unexpecte release from his post had to d with a critical statement h had made at a plenary meetin of the Central Committe From 1967 to 1970, Nikol Yegorychev was Deput Minister of Tractor and A ricultural Machinery. He wa Soviet ambassador to D nmark for 14 years, and fro 1984 to 1987 filled the posts Deputy Minister of Mechanic Engineering of Livestoc Farming and Fodder Produc tion and First Deputy Chai man of the Presidium of th U.S.S.R. Chamber of Com merce and Industry.

ke his place, the opposition more and more vigorously cusing the party of a power id.

Though Papandreou will be London until the end of the nth, he has to be back in nens by October 28 for nal Ochi Day.

* * *

ew athletes are able to win ampionships in both win- and summer sports. One n all-rounder is **Christa thenburger** of the G.D.R., o holds the world titles for speed skating and track cycling. She has won twice at world speed skating championships, while in 1986 at Colorado Springs, in the U.S., she outstripped the world's top cyclists. At the Calgary Winter Olympics, she took the gold in the 1,000 metres, while at the recent Summer Olympics in Seoul, she won the silver in the 1,000-metre cycling race.

Christa will soon be 29. She has devoted nearly 21 years to sport, first with four years in figure skating, and then 17 in speed skating. The last ten years have been combined with cycling, for whether in cycling or speed skating events, she loves speed.

She is often asked which of the two sports she prefers. She says that though she likes both, she feels more sure of herself on ice, which is only natural as she has far more experience in speed skating, having won 500-odd events in this field and only about 50 on the cycling track.

Curiously enough, it was her skating coach Ernst Luding, whom she married this year, who induced her to start cycling.

Christa is not only a fine athlete, she is also a town councillor in Dresden, where she lives today. On the Town Council's Youth Committee she is responsible for the promotion of sports and physical fitness programmes.

* * *

Japanese film director, 54-year-old **Juzo Itami**, is firmly established as the country's No. 1 director, though he is only completing his fifth picture, whereas many others of his age have produced dozens. However, it is contended that so far no one has been able to make films

on serious issues that also enjoy box office success. Itami believes he has achieved this delicate balance.

Itami's father was also a director and produced 36 pictures during the era of the silent film: still, Itami Jr does not believe his father has had any effect on his own oeuvre. Before turning to film-making, he worked in design and advertising, as well as acting in TV programmes.

His most famous film is his first, "The Funeral," made in 1984, which he produced after his father-in-law's death. In it he satirized the absurd situations that arise when tradition conflicts with Japan's present-day realities. His next picture, "Tampopo," is a kaleidoscope of unconnected episodes centring upon the hero's visits to a succession of eating places. In his "Funeral," Itami says he sought to bring out the theme by means of a rough sketch in the style of Chekhov, the favourite author in Japan today. In "Tampopo" he has borrowed heavily from Buñuel. His other two pictures are whodunits about a female tax inspector. His fifth film is a horror story.

"My style is to have many styles, to change as the actor does in each new role," Itami says.

* * *

rock star with a message

k singer **Konstantin Kin-** v of the Leningrad group a is celebrating his thirtieth nday as the plaintiff in a t case to quash the undless charge of prop- ting nazism, laid against by V. Kokosov in the ngrad paper Smena under headline "Alisa with the ted Fringe." However, it ears that this affair, which recently may have had a ewhat adverse effect for chev, is ending well, for a ten-month law suit, na has apologized and alized Kokosov.

ccording to a TASS poll, in 1987 Alisa's single and in 1988 their LP Energia top- the charts. The LP "Hell k" is in preparation. This , at the film festival in Bul- a, Kinchev carried off the

prize for the best male role in the film "The Burglar" which, it is maintained, owed its popularity exclusively to Kinchev's artistic talent and his fame as a singer. However, his fans are disappointed that like other social rock groups, Alisa is not often heard on the wireless or seen on television.

Why is Kinchev, the grandson of a Bulgarian Communist who perished in one of Stalin's concentration camps, so popular with today's Soviet youth? This is due to the satirical barbs he flings at demagogues of every hue, his artistry, his expressiveness and his talented singing: incidentally, he studied at the Bolshoi school. His poster-like poetry is greatly reminiscent of Mayakovsky.

Tapes of Alisa's performances are widely shown in the West, and the group has received numerous invitations to go on tour abroad. However, thus far it has not been able to do so.

Currently Alisa is working on a new LP, tentatively entitled "206, part 2."

E. Brandman

Crowds and power

Elias Canetti on a XX century phenomenon



Soviet readers are just beginning to be acquainted with the work of Nobel Prize winner for literature Elias Canetti. The publishing house Khudozhestvennaya Literature is at last going to bring out his 1931 novel, "Auto da Fé," although it should be said that it was not in this country alone that he was long refused recognition.

Elias Canetti was born in 1905 in the Bulgarian town of Ruschuk on the Danube. In 1911 the Canettis moved, first to England, then to Austria. Elias also lived in Germany and Switzerland. It is noteworthy that he only started to learn German when he was eight years old, yet this did not prevent him from becoming a master of German prose.

"Auto da Fé," Canetti's only novel, was written in 1931, but finding publishers for this sophisticated and largely unorthodox book took him four years, and the novel only appeared in 1935. At the time neither critics nor readers paid any attention to it and the book went next to unnoticed.

Canetti does not seem to have been much affected by this, as if he was certain of ultimate success. He was already occupied with the intensive, if leisurely, project that was to be his life's work – a fundamental treatise entitled "Crowds and Power."

"In 1925 I set myself the task of studying the phenomenon of the crowd," wrote Canetti in his autobiographical work " Eye-play" (1986), "and since 1931 I've tried to understand how masses generate power." This book is far from being purely academic, though Canetti collected material for it from works on history, ethnology, sociology and psychology. Life itself was his source.

"It was a rare day at that time that I didn't reflect on the phenomenon of the mass," said Canetti in "Eye-play." "I included in my book everything that happened in the world. It wasn't a cursory experience. I've never confined myself to studying press reports." Canetti analyzed the rise of nazi feeling in the still independent Austria, from the angle of the phenomenon of the crowd: "There was no hope of dealing with poverty and unemployment on a purely national basis. Many people despaired in this impasse and succumbed to the German disease. They were hoping to be happier once a larger mass had absorbed them, and failed to realize that the only possible outcome of this was a new war."

"Crowds and power" was only published in 1960, and Canetti became famous practically overnight. In 1981 the 76-year-old author won the Nobel Prize for literature.

Excerpts from this book are being prepared for print at Progress Publishers

THE OPEN AND CLOSED MASS

A crowd that appears from nothing is a phenomenon no less enigmatic than it is universal. Say there are five to ten people, a dozen at most and no one has announced or expects anything, yet at the next moment the whole place is packed with people. They converge from everywhere, as if all roads had become one-way. Many of them do not have the slightest idea of what is going on – ask them, and they won't be able to tell you – and still they rush to join the crowd. They are resolute in their movement, which shows that they are not driven by mere curiosity. One could say that the movement is contagious, but that is not the only reason; all these people have a common destination the idea of which appeared before they knew it themselves. This destination is the place where the crowd is densest.

We shall consider the phenomenon of the spontaneous mass in greater depth. The nucleus of the crowd is not as spontaneous as it seems. But of the rest of it this spontaneity is characteristic. Once the crowd appears, its tendency is to grow. This tendency is the first and fundamental feature of the crowd. The crowd does not hesitate to swallow anyone who comes its way...

THE THIRST FOR DESTRUCTION

The crowd's thirst to destroy is much spoken of, as it is the first feature to leap to the eye. Houses and household things first fall prey to it. As household things such as windows, mirrors, pots, pictures and crockery are in the main fragile, it is the general belief that their very fragility moves the crowd to destroy them. Doubtless the noise of destruction, broken crockery, shattered glass and so on adds greatly to the pleasure of the action.

The destruction of works of art depicting certain things is the destruction of the hierarchy the crowd no longer recognizes. The crowd attacks commonly accepted and seemingly

indisputable ideas. They are as enduring as they are immovable. They seem to have existed since time immemorial... To approach them with hostile intentions was unthinkable. Today they are overthrown and lie shattered...

HALLMARK OF THE RULER

The first and decisive feature of a ruler is authority over life and death. The death sentence he passes is carried out without fail. This is the index of his power, which is indisputable for as long as his authority to pass a death sentence is indisputable...

The only true subject is one whom the ruler can have executed. This is thus the ultimate test of obedience. Soldiers are imbued with double preparedness: they are sent off to kill enemies, but they themselves are prepared to die for the ruler at any time. However, not only soldiers, but all his subjects know their life and death is in his hands.

One who has ceased to obey prepares for battle. No ruler can rest assured of the total obedience of his subjects. For as long as they let him kill them, the ruler can believe himself safe. But once someone escapes the sentence, his power is threatened.



Drawing by Igor Smirnov

VIOLENCE AND POWER

Violence is something we perceive as belonging to our time. There is a strong element of coercion in violence; it is more immediate than power.

The difference between violence and power can be demonstrated by the very simple example of the cat and the mouse.

Once caught, the mouse experiences violence on the part of the cat which has caught it, is holding it and is going to kill it. But once the cat starts to play with the mouse, a new relationship emerges. The cat lets go, watching the mouse run some distance. Once the mouse turns its back on the cat and starts running, it leaves the cat's sphere of violence. The cat can still catch the mouse, but once the cat has let the mouse get away, it leaves the cat's sphere of power as well. However, for as long as the mouse remains within the cat's reach, it also remains within its sphere of power. The area that the cat controls, the moment of hope it gives the mouse while still watching it and wanting to kill it, all these factors – the area, the hope, the control and the desire to kill – make up the essence of power, which in fact is power...

THE SECRET

Secrecy is the nucleus of power. The act of spying is clandestine in its nature. Hiding, the beast melts into the background trying hard not to be noticed.

Secrecy has an active sphere of application. The ruler who resorts to secrecy knows it well and is perfectly capable of formulating his objective at a given moment. He knows who is to be shadowed to achieve it, and he knows which of his henchmen is good at spying. He has much to hide because he wants to achieve much, and he constructs a system where one secret obscures another; he confides one secret to one person, then another secret to someone else and carefully sees to it that these people cannot make contact with each other.

Everyone who knows anything is always under the control of someone else who, in turn, does not know what secret the man he controls possesses. He must note every word and every move of the man he shadows; these data, when collected, make it possible for the ruler to understand the mode of thinking of the person in question. But the spy himself is under surveillance of still others, and one report complements and corrects another. The only one who has the key to this complex system of spying is the ruler himself. The ruler knows how dangerous it is to hand this key over to someone else...

Mistrust of freer forms of government, contempt for them as utterly ineffective is bound up with the fact that there is less secrecy in them. Hundreds of people take part in parliamentary debates, and the essence of these debates is openness. Here opinions clash, and even closed sessions are hardly secret. The professional scrutiny of the press and financial interests often help to spill the beans.

Reverence for dictatorships is overwhelmingly due to the fact that they are able to concentrate secrecy in one place; in democracies a secret is shared amongst many and effectively defused. Democracies are ridiculed for making all secrets public. Some people seem to be lamenting the lack of resolution, while in fact they are discouraged by the lack of secrecy.

People are capable of great endurance when trouble strikes violently and insidiously. It is as if the temptation to servitude existed in every of us, drawing us against our will into the monster's maw. We don't understand what has happened or why; then there are many who are readily marching into the open jaws. They reverently wait and tremble, hoping to become the chosen victim. This behavior is the apotheosis of secrecy, and all the rest is subordinate to glorifying it...

Resumé by M. KHARITONOV

Galich returns



"I didn't write my songs with a malicious intent, out of the desire to paint our reality black, or to play up to anyone. I gave voice to what hurts each and all in this country, and I pulled no punches."

Even a year ago it would have been hard to imagine that Alexander Galich's 70th birthday would be celebrated with full ceremony at the House of Men of Letters, that TV – Leningrad, Moscow and central – would speak quietly of his work and fate, that his poetry and prose would be published, and that articles would be written about him. Melodia has already prepared three records of his songs and poetry, work has started on three documentary films about him, and only the other day the first Soviet record of Galich's work appeared – true, a plastic one, as a supplement to the magazine Krugozor (No. 10), but on it the poem "The Outcome" and the song "Once Again about the Devil" are by Galich himself.

In the documentary made in Norway by Rafael Goldin there is an episode showing Galich on an Oslo street, and then stopping outside a shopwindow displaying his first record. And Galich s ays: "For a moment I shut my eyes and saw Kalinin Prospekt and myself approaching the Melodia shop and seeing my record..."

In the offing are new publications, and books are being prepared for printing. On May 12 the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Cinema Workers revoked its previous decision expelling Galich from the union. It was an easy and happy opportunity to do good: people made a clean breast of their guilt feeling, which in fact was not theirs, for the leadership of the union is now made up of new people. "We are restoring justice," Andrei Smirnov, who presided over the Secretariat's meeting, told the press.

The announcement that Galich had been reinstated in the Union of Soviet Writers is a horse of another colour, for the decision had been taken unanimously by almost the very people who had kicked him out even of the Writers' Foundation, leaving him without any means of support. His fellow writers had voluntarily helped send Galich to the point of no return, as expulsion then seemed.

The former accusations that his ideology was "alien" have been given the lie by his poetry, which is now available to the whole country. He did not want to leave. He was in effect deported. The October issue of the magazine Sovetskaya Biografiya published the open letter Galich wrote in 1972, which naturally never saw the light at the time, in which he said that he was being expelled "for my songs, which I sang openly." People who accused Galich (as before him they had accused Akhmatova, Zoshchenko, Pasternak, Sinyavsky and Daniel, and then Brodsky and others) of having an "alien ideology" were in effect not at all interested in any ideology, but had merely advanced in closed ranks of the poet.

That Galich had deeply loved his country was spoken off by Evgeny Yevtushenko at a gathering at the Union of Soviet Architects. That is also evident from the numerous interviews Galich gave (starting with the first one at the foot of the aircraft in which he had arrived in Vienna: he spoke not of his troubles, but about Russian and Soviet poetry), and from his regular programmes on poetry, which are now regarded eligible for Soviet radio unexpurgated.

All his former crimes have now become virtues: his long-standing friendship with Andrei Sakharov and many other things... In his open letter Galich had written: "My literary rights have been taken away from me, but my duties remain – to write songs and sing them."

It seems to me that our duty today – our duty to Galich, to ourselves, our country and the entire civilized world – is to say everything, leaving nothing unsaid. To say that in the so-called period of stagnation different people left the Soviet Union, but "the honour" of being expelled, of being reduced to despair and forced to leave, often befell the best, the most talented and honest, those who had adopted Heine's formula of the poet's heart rent by the crack that rends the world.

Nina Kreitner

Photo by Mikhail Baranov



Wounds and Sutures
Wood, canvas, nails



Weather Vane
(cloth sculpture)
Wood, cord, canvas

Little Revolution
Hammer, sickle, flag, electric motor. Metallic construction in an iron cage

Twine Chair
Kitchen chair, with back and seat stitched with binding twine

The bizzarre world of Günter Uecker

The West German artist and sculptor Günter Uecker comes up with peculiar "recipes" for his creations. Here is one: buy ten kilos of nails from a hardware store; pick up an old round table from a dump; saw off its legs, drive the nails into the table top haphazardly and at crazy angles; hang the result on the wall and fit a tiny motor to rotate it slowly. Fix two lamps to the sides. And throw in some artistic talent for good measure. The patterns of light and shade will arouse a wealth of unique associations in the viewer, provided he has the patience to watch the rotating disk for long enough...

Some of the other eye-catching exhibits include a board which is periodically hurled and slammed against the floor by an electric motor; a fanciful combination of a lawn mower, two wigs and a book-stand; and an Electric Garden – a heap of sand that glows violet.

Children regard Uecker's works as fascinating toys. They get a big kick out of pushing buttons, starting motors, and setting sculptures like New York Dancer in motion.

Adult visitors enjoy a video recording of the 1979 Bayreuth production of Wagner's Lohengrin, with the scenery designed by Günter Uecker.

A. Sidorov





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